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EYEWITNESS IDENTIFICATION AND THE 
PROBLEMATICS OF BLACKSTONIAN 
REFORM OF THE CRIMINAL LAW 
LAWRENCE ROSENTHAL* 
A substantial number of wrongful convictions are attributable to 
inaccurate identifications of perpetrators, stemming from the difficulties that 
eyewitnesses can experience in accurately perceiving and later recalling 
faces.  Many have argued that courts should employ prophylactic rules to 
prevent the admission of unreliable identification evidence.  Yet, most 
jurisdictions continue to follow the deferential approach to the admission of 
eyewitness identification evidence taken by the United States Supreme Court 
in Manson v. Brathwaite.  Commentators have universally condemned this 
state of affairs. 
This Article offers a departure from the existing commentary by taking 
seriously the possibility that courts have good reason for their reluctance to 
embrace prophylactic rules excluding evidence thought to present unduly 
high risks of convicting the innocent. 
The case for reform is rooted in Blackstone’s admonition that the law 
should be wary of admitting evidence of guilt, preferring erroneous 
acquittals to wrongful convictions.  It is difficult, however, to construct a 
Blackstonian case for the exclusion of evidence thought to be unduly likely 
to produce wrongful convictions.  Given our limited knowledge about the 
error rates that inhere in most types of evidence, Blackstonian reform has no 
ascertainable stopping point; excluding evidence that poses what is thought 
to be an undue risk of wrongful conviction could result in the exclusion of 
virtually all evidence of guilt.  To illustrate the point, this Article considers 
an issue on which the lower courts have split—the role of corroborative 
 
 * Professor of Law, Chapman University, Dale E. Fowler School of Law. The author has 
benefitted from the incisive comments of Kevin Cole, Donald Kochan, Scott Howe, Eric 
Miller, Ric Simmons, Jonathan Witmer-Rich, and those who attended the presentation of 
earlier drafts at Crimfest at Cardozo Law School and Southern California Criminal Justice 
Roundtable held at the University of California, Irvine School of Law. The author is also 
grateful to Rachel Cherny-Santos, Joseph Hernandez, Kaylee Sauvey, Jaime Traxler, Sherry 
Leysen and the staff of the Rinker Law Library for invaluable research assistance. 
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evidence in assessing the admissibility of an eyewitness’s identification. 
Although Blackstonian prophylactic rules reject the consideration of 
corroborative evidence, the reliability of most evidence cannot be assessed 
in isolation.  Reliability can usually be assessed only in the context of all 
pertinent evidence.  Thus, totality-of-the-circumstances tests, such as the 
approach reflected in the Supreme Court’s decisions on eyewitness 
identification, are about the best we can do—as prophylactic evidentiary 
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INTRODUCTION 
More than a half-century ago, the Supreme Court wrote: “The vagaries 
of eyewitness identification are well-known; the annals of criminal law are 
rife with instances of mistaken identification.”1  Time has done little to alter 
this assessment; analyses of wrongful convictions continue to identify 
inaccurate eyewitness identification as a leading cause of the conviction of 
the innocent.2 
The reasons why eyewitness identifications lead to wrongful 
convictions can be briefly summarized.3  A large volume of research has 
disclosed a substantial error rate in witnesses’ efforts to identify a suspect 
accurately, stemming from the difficulties that witnesses can experience in 
accurately perceiving and later recalling faces.4  In particular, individuals 
have a tendency to select the individual in a lineup or other identification 
procedure who most resembles their recollection of the suspect, which injects 
a substantial risk of error into identification evidence.5  The research also 
identifies a heightened risk of error when suggestive identification 
procedures are employed—for example, when only the suspect or his picture 
is shown to a witness (a “showup”), or the use of a lineup of individuals 
(actual or photographic) in which only the suspect fits the witness’s previous 
description of the perpetrator, or when witnesses receive instructions or 
 
 1 United States v. Wade, 388 U.S. 218, 228 (1967) (footnote omitted). 
 2 See, e.g., Russell D. Covey, Suspect Evidence and Coalmine Canaries, 55 AM. CRIM. L. 
REV. 537, 546–48, 547 tbl.2 (2018); Brandon L. Garrett, Convicting the Innocent Redux, in 
WRONGFUL CONVICTIONS AND THE DNA REVOLUTION: TWENTY-FIVE YEARS OF FREEING THE 
INNOCENT 40, 45–46, 46 fig.3.3 (Daniel S. Medwed ed., 2017); Samuel Gross, What We Think, 
What We Know and What We Think We Know About False Convictions, 14 OHIO ST. J. CRIM. 
L. 753, 769–73 (2017); Andrew M. Smith & Brian L. Cutler, Introduction: Identification 
Procedures and Conviction of the Innocent, in REFORM OF EYEWITNESS IDENTIFICATION 
PROCEDURES 3, 7–11 (Brian L. Cutler ed., 2013) [hereinafter REFORM OF EYEWITNESS 
IDENTIFICATION PROCEDURES]. 
 3 A more detailed account of those aspects of the pertinent research most directly 
applicable to this Article is found in Part II.A.1 below. 
 4 See, e.g., COMM. ON SCI. APPROACHES TO UNDERSTANDING & MAXIMIZING THE VALIDITY 
AND RELIABILITY OF EYEWITNESS IDENTIFICATIONS IN LAW ENF’T & THE COURTS, IDENTIFYING 
THE CULPRIT: ASSESSING EYEWITNESS IDENTIFICATION 45–101 (2014) [hereinafter 
IDENTIFYING THE CULPRIT]; ELIZABETH F. LOFTUS ET AL., EYEWITNESS TESTIMONY: CIVIL AND 
CRIMINAL 13–78 (5th ed. 2013); BOAZ SANGERO, SAFETY FROM FALSE CONVICTIONS 182–85 
(2016); Gary L. Wells, Eyewitness Identification, in 2 REFORMING CRIMINAL JUSTICE 259, 
263–68 (Erik Luna ed., 2017). 
 5 See, e.g., Gary L. Wells & Eric P. Seelau, Eyewitness Identification: Psychological 
Research and Legal Policy on Lineups, 1 PSYCHOL. PUB. POL’Y & L. 765, 768–69 (1995) 
(summarizing research). 
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feedback encouraging them to make an identification.6  Moreover, studies 
have found that jurors have limited ability to assess the reliability of 
eyewitness identifications and, instead, tend to over-believe eyewitnesses 
and discount the risk of eyewitness error.7  As one commentary put it: 
Unlike accomplice witnesses, the typical eyewitness [to a crime] is a passerby who has 
no motive to lie. Unlike circumstantial evidence, eyewitness testimony is directly 
probative of guilt and frequently expressed with a high degree of certainty. Unlike 
expert testimony, eyewitness testimony is immediately understood by even the most 
confused, inattentive, or ignorant juror. And unlike many other kinds of evidence, 
eyewitness testimony is rarely the subject of any cautionary instruction from the 
judge . . . .8 
In light of these problems, many have urged reforms to reduce the risk 
of error created by potentially suggestive identification procedures, such as 
training officers to avoid suggestive identification procedures; utilizing 
double-blind procedures in which witnesses and lineup administrators are 
unaware of the identity of the suspect; and instructing witnesses during 
 
 6 See, e.g., BRIAN L. CUTLER & STEVEN D. PENROD, MISTAKEN IDENTIFICATION: THE 
EYEWITNESS, PSYCHOLOGY, AND THE LAW 113–36 (1995) (discussing risks of error related to 
lineup instruction bias, lineup construction, and lineup administrator bias); Steven E. Clark & 
Ryan D. Godfrey, Eyewitness Identification and Innocence Risk, 16 PSYCHONOMIC BULL. & 
REV. 22, 29–33 (2009) (discussing risks of error related to lineup construction, showup 
identifications, lineup instructions, and simultaneous versus sequential lineups); David A. 
Sonenshein & Robin Nilon, Eyewitness Errors and Wrongful Convictions: Let’s Give Science 
a Chance, 89 OR. L. REV. 263, 270–74 (2010) (discussing suggestiveness in showup 
identifications, lineup construction, and administrator bias); Gary L. Wells & Deah S. 
Quinlivan, Suggestive Eyewitness Identification Procedures and the Supreme Court’s 
Reliability Test in Light of Eyewitness Science: 30 Years Later, 33 LAW & HUM. BEHAV. 1, 6–
9 (2009) (discussing risks of error related to lineup instructions, lineup composition, showup 
identifications, and administrator bias). 
 7 For discussions of the pertinent research, see, for example, CUTLER & PENROD, supra 
note 6, at 181–96; DAN SIMON, IN DOUBT: THE PSYCHOLOGY OF THE CRIMINAL JUSTICE 
PROCESS 150–57 (2012); Steven E. Clark, Blackstone and the Balance of Eyewitness 
Identification Evidence, 74 ALB. L. REV. 1105, 1147–52 (2010-11); Jennifer L. Devenport et 
al., Eyewitness Identification Evidence: Evaluating Commonsense Evaluations, 3 PSYCHOL. 
PUB. POL’Y & L. 338, 346–53 (1997); Richard S. Schmechel et al., Beyond the Ken? Testing 
Jurors’ Understanding of Eyewitness Reliability Evidence, 46 JURIMETRICS 177, 193–205 
(2006); Dan Simon, On Juror Decisionmaking: An Empathic Inquiry, 15 ANN. REV. L & SOC. 
SCI. 415, 419–20 (2019); Dan Simon, The Limited Diagnosticity of Criminal Trials, 64 VAND. 
L. REV. 143, 152–60 (2011); and Gary L. Wells et al., Eyewitness Identification Procedures: 
Recommendations for Lineups and Photospreads, 22 LAW. & HUM. BEHAV. 603, 620–21 
(1998). 
 8 Jed S. Rakoff & Elizabeth F. Loftus, The Intractability of Inaccurate Eyewitness 
Identification, 147 DAEDALUS, Fall 2018, at 90, 91; cf. Perry v. New Hampshire, 565 U.S. 
228, 260 (2012) (Sotomayor, J., dissenting) (“[J]urors find eyewitness evidence unusually 
powerful and their ability to assess credibility is hindered by a witness’ false confidence in the 
accuracy of his or her identification.”). 
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lineups that the suspect or the suspect’s picture might not be present and that 
they are free to make no identification.9 
In Manson v. Brathwaite,10 the Supreme Court addressed the question 
of whether an unreliable eyewitness identification can deprive a criminal 
defendant of the constitutional right to a fair trial under the Due Process 
Clause.  The Court concluded that even when investigators utilize 
unnecessarily suggestive procedures, an ensuing identification should not be 
excluded from evidence absent a finding that it is unreliable in light of “the 
totality of the circumstances”—rejecting “a strict exclusionary rule or new 
standard of due process.”11  Under this approach, “if the indicia of reliability 
are strong enough to outweigh the corrupting effect of the police-arranged 
suggestive circumstances, the identification evidence ordinarily will be 
admitted, and the jury will ultimately determine its worth.”12  Manson rarely 
results in the exclusion of eyewitness identification evidence; a review of 
federal cases available on the Westlaw database from the date Manson was 
decided in 1977 until January of 2010, for example, found that identification 
evidence was excluded under Manson in only 3.54% of cases, despite the use 
of suggestive identification procedures in 57.10% of cases.13 
Manson reflects the predominant approach to judicial scrutiny of 
eyewitness identification evidence; as one recent survey concluded: “[A] 
large proportion of law enforcement agencies . . . have not made significant 
reforms and most courts in the United States still use some version of the 
Manson approach to dealing with eyewitness identification evidence.”14  
 
 9 For discussions of recommended reforms along these lines, see, for example, 
IDENTIFYING THE CULPRIT, supra note 4, at 106–07; Rakoff & Loftus, supra note 8, at 94–95; 
and Wells, supra note 4, at 277–78. 
 10 432 U.S. 98 (1977). 
 11 Id. at 113 (internal quotation and citation omitted). 
 12 Perry, 565 U.S. at 232. 
 13 Nicholas A. Kahn-Fogel, Manson and Its Progeny: An Empirical Examination of 
American Eyewitness Law, 3 ALA. C.R. & C.L. L. REV. 175, 209–11, 211 tbl.1 (2012). The 
prevalence of suggestive procedures fell only slightly over time. See id. at 220 (“[N]ear the 
middle of the time period, the probability of a case in the data set involving verifiable 
suggestion was about 60%, but it was about 66% near the beginning of the time period and 
only about 52% near the end.”). Moreover, despite the mounting social science evidence 
illustrating the dangers of suggestive procedures, the willingness of courts to suppress 
evidence under Manson in cases involving suggestion actually decreased over time. See id. 
(“[E]ven isolating only the 840 cases in which suggestion was evident, courts were 
significantly less likely to suppress in-court identification evidence as time went on.”) 
(footnote omitted). 
 14 Wells, supra note 4, at 276; see also Nicholas A. Kahn-Fogel, The Promises and Pitfalls 
of State Eyewitness Identification Reforms, 104 KY. L.J. 99, 120 (2015-16) (“[T]he vast 
majority of jurisdictions have followed Manson.”) 
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Commentators, however, have uniformly condemned Manson as inconsistent 
with the large body of research that has emerged since that decision, 
disclosing the perils of eyewitness identification.15  The academic 
commentary on eyewitness identification evidence contains nary a defense 
of Manson.16 
The attacks on Manson as tolerating the admission of evidence thought 
unduly likely to produce convictions of the innocent call to mind 
Blackstone’s famous admonition: “[E]vidence of felony should be admitted 
 
 15 For helpful examples of the substantial volume of commentary criticizing Manson, see 
JIM DWYER ET AL., ACTUAL INNOCENCE: FIVE DAYS TO EXECUTION AND OTHER DISPATCHES 
FROM THE WRONGLY CONVICTED 74–75 (2000); BRANDON L. GARRETT, CONVICTING THE 
INNOCENT: WHERE CRIMINAL PROSECUTIONS GO WRONG 53–54, 62–79 (2011); Clark, supra 
note 7, at 1135–42; Deborah Davis & Elizabeth F. Loftus, Inconsistencies between Law and 
the Limits of Human Cognition, in MEMORY AND LAW 29, 49–53 (Lynn Nadel & Walter P. 
Sinnott-Armstrong eds., 2012); Brandon L. Garrett, Eyewitnesses and Exclusion, 65 VAND. L. 
REV. 449, 467–75 (2012); Sandra Guerra Thompson, Eyewitness Identifications and State 
Courts as Guardians Against Wrongful Conviction, 7 OHIO ST. J. CRIM. L. 603, 608–21 
(2010); Aliza B. Kaplan & Janis C. Puracal, Who Could It Be Now? Challenging the 
Reliability of First Time In-Court Identifications after State v. Henderson and State v. Lawson, 
105 J. CRIM. L. & CRIMINOLOGY 947, 971–73 (2015); Timothy P. O’Toole & Giovanna Shay, 
Manson v. Brathwaite Revisited: Towards a New Rule of Decision for Due Process Challenges 
to Eyewitness Identification Procedures, 41 VAL. U. L. REV. 109, 125–32 (2006); Benjamin 
F. Rosenberg, Rethinking the Right to Due Process in Connection with Pretrial Identification 
Procedures: An Analysis and a Proposal, 79 KY. L.J. 259, 275–97 (1990-91); Sonenshein & 
Nilon, supra note 6, at 274–78; Wells & Quinlivan, supra note 6, at 14–17; Richard A. Wise 
et al., A Tripartite Solution to Eyewitness Error, 97 J. CRIM. L. & CRIMINOLOGY 807, 815–19 
(2007). 
 16 About the only defense of Manson that can be found in the literature comes in a brief 
passage in a much longer article written by a prominent judge: 
[C]ommentators have argued for, and some courts have even agreed to, broad restrictions on the 
admissibility of eyewitness testimony . . . . Not only might it ultimately decrease the accuracy of 
criminal verdicts – by taking fact-finding away from diverse juries and giving it to singular judges 
– but it also impinges on the jury’s democratically grounded role as fact-finder. Nor are such 
broad, judicially created rules of exclusion necessary. The Sixth Amendment dictates 
confrontation rather than exclusion as the appropriate approach to eyewitness testimony. The 
Confrontation Clause augments the jury’s role, and it is hardly up to judges to diminish it. Of 
course . . . the Confrontation Clause excludes the out-of-court testimonial statements of witnesses 
who do not testify at trial, unless that witness is “unavailable” and the defendant “had a prior 
opportunity for cross-examination.” As a general matter, however, eyewitness testimony should 
not be subject to a judge’s decision as to admissibility but should instead go through the adversary 
process and be left to the jury’s determination of its value and weight. 
J. Harvie Wilkinson III, In Defense of American Criminal Justice, 67 VAND. L. REV. 1099, 
1161–62 (2014) (footnotes omitted). This argument fails to confront the evidence suggesting 
that eyewitness identification evidence comes with a risk of error that is unlikely to be 
appreciated by jurors. If this is the case, the availability of a jury trial would not constitute an 
adequate response to the risk of error injected into the criminal process by suggestive 
identification procedures. 
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cautiously: for the law holds, that it is better that ten guilty persons escape, 
than that one innocent suffer.”17  Indeed, commentators frequently invoke 
Blackstone’s ratio to argue for more vigorous judicial policing of eyewitness 
identification evidence.18 
Rather than adding to the chorus of criticism condemning Manson and 
the prevailing approach to the admission of eyewitness identification 
evidence, however, this Article offers a different perspective—by taking 
seriously the possibility that courts have good reason for their reluctance to 
embrace Blackstonian reform of criminal evidence law. 
Part I reviews the development of the Manson test, as well as the 
alternatives adopted by a handful of jurisdictions.  It concludes that even 
those jurisdictions that have embraced alternatives to Manson have not 
achieved much in the way of meaningful reform. 
Part II demonstrates that the virtues of Manson lie in the difficulties 
presented by the alternatives, which involve the use of prophylactic rules 
thought to minimize the risk of error.  It is fiendishly difficult to know 
whether such measures have benefits that exceed their costs.  To illustrate the 
point, Part II focuses on an issue on which the lower courts have split—the 
role of corroborative evidence in assessing the admissibility of eyewitness 
identification evidence.  Blackstonian prophylaxis focuses on the procedures 
employed to obtain an identification rather than on whether it is corroborated.  
Any effort to assess the reliability of eyewitness identification evidence in 
isolation, however, is deeply problematic.  The reliability of evidence rarely 
can be assessed in a vacuum; in the main, reliability is properly assessed in 
light of the totality of the circumstances—including the available 
corroborative evidence, or lack thereof.  By disclaiming inquiry into 
corroboration, accordingly, prophylactic rules would exclude a great deal of 
reliable evidence.
The Blackstonian response to these difficulties rests on the view that we 
should prefer false acquittals of the guilty to false convictions of the innocent.  
Accordingly, if eyewitness identification evidence presents special risks to 
the innocent, its admission should be viewed with special caution, even if 
this will increase the rate at which the guilty go free.  To be sure, a 
Blackstonian preference for false acquittals over false convictions 
undoubtedly underlies the heavy burden of proof that the prosecution must 
 
 17 4 WILLIAM BLACKSTONE, COMMENTARIES ON THE LAWS OF ENGLAND 352. 
 18 See, e.g., D. Michael Risinger, At What Cost? Blind Testing, Eyewitness Identification, 
and What Can and Cannot Be Counted as a Cost of Reducing Information Available for 
Decision, 58 HOW. L.J. 333, 359 (2015) (“[T]he perceptive reader will hear an echo of the 
Blackstone ratio . . . . [I]t is to be used as an approach to taking reformatory actions that will 
improve the performance of a system-in-being at the margins.”). 
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shoulder in a criminal case.19  It is a separate question, however, whether 
additional safeguards are required when it comes to the admission of 
eyewitness identification evidence.  As Part II demonstrates, we know little 
about the error rates that inhere in most types of evidence; the perils of 
eyewitness identification evidence may not be unusual.  There is, 
accordingly, no identifiable stopping point for Blackstonian prophylactic 
rules that exclude evidence giving rise to a risk of wrongful convictions.  That 
risk inheres in virtually all evidence.  There is, therefore, little basis for 
erecting special prophylactic exclusionary rules designed to screen out 
evidence regarded as especially unreliable.  Totality-of-the-circumstances 
tests are about the best we can do. 
I. MANSON V. BRATHWAITE AND THE LIMITED SCOPE OF 
JUDICIAL GATEKEEPING IN THE ADMISSION OF 
EYEWITNESS IDENTIFICATION EVIDENCE 
The predominant view taken by courts as they assess the admissibility 
of eyewitness identification evidence remains the highly deferential rule of 
Manson v. Brathwaite.20  There is, however, a minority view that demands a 
more substantial showing of reliability before an eyewitness identification 
can be placed before the jury. 
A. MANSON’S APPROACH TO EYEWITNESS IDENTIFICATION 
EVIDENCE 
The traditional rule governing the admissibility of eyewitness 
identification evidence was straightforward: “The overwhelming majority of 
American courts have always treated the evidence question not as one of 
admissibility but as one of credibility for the jury.”21  On this view, 
accordingly, judges played essentially no gatekeeping role—it was up to the 
jury to assess the reliability of otherwise relevant eyewitness identification 
evidence.22 
 
 19 See, e.g., Speiser v. Randall, 357 U.S. 513, 525–26 (1958) (“Where one party has at 
stake an interest of transcending value—as a criminal defendant his liberty—this margin of 
error is reduced as to him by the process of placing on the other party the burden of producing 
a sufficiency of proof in the first instance, and of persuading the factfinder at the conclusion 
of the trial of his guilt beyond a reasonable doubt.”). For a more general discussion of the basis 
for the prosecution’s burden of proof beyond reasonable doubt in criminal cases, see In re 
Winship, 397 U.S. 358, 361–64 (1970). 
 20 432 U.S. 98 (1977). 
 21 Stovall v. Denno, 388 U.S. 293, 299–300 (1967) (citation omitted). 
 22 See, e.g., Perry v. New Hampshire, 565 U.S. 228, 245 (2012) (“[T]he jury, not the judge, 
traditionally determines the reliability of evidence.”). 
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1. The Road to Manson 
The Supreme Court first broke with the traditional view in United States 
v. Wade.23  After observing that “[a] major factor contributing to the high 
incidence of miscarriage of justice from mistaken identification has been the 
degree of suggestion inherent in the manner in which the prosecution presents 
the suspect to witnesses for pretrial identification,”24 the Court worried that 
“[t]he trial which might determine the accused’s fate may well not be that in 
the courtroom but that at the pretrial confrontation . . . with little or no 
effective appeal from the judgment there rendered by the witness—‘that’s 
the man.’”25  The Court therefore characterized the lineup at which Wade 
was identified as the perpetrator of the crime as a “critical stage of the 
prosecution” at which Wade was entitled to the assistance of counsel under 
the Sixth Amendment.26 
Wade was something of a false start.  Its practical significance was 
limited five years later, when the Court held that the right to have counsel 
present at an identification procedure did not extend to identifications 
occurring before formal criminal charges are filed.27  Subsequently, the Court 
concluded that even for post-charging identifications, no right to counsel 
attaches to the use of photographic identifications because of the ease with 
which a photo array can be preserved for subsequent inspection.28  But even 
putting aside Wade’s limited scope, there is reason to doubt the efficacy of 
its reliance on the presence of counsel as a vehicle for enhancing the 
reliability of eyewitness identifications.  At best, the presence of defense 
counsel might assist the defense in identifying potential flaws in the process, 
and perhaps deter overt misconduct.  But even when defense counsel is 
present, the absence of standards that require reliable identification 
 
 23 388 U.S. 218 (1967). 
 24 Id. at 228. 
 25 Id. at 235–36. 
 26 Id. at 236–38. In pertinent part, the Sixth Amendment provides: “In all criminal 
prosecutions, the accused shall enjoy the right to have the Assistance of Counsel for his 
defence.” U.S. CONST. amend. VI. In a companion case decided the same day as Wade, the 
Court held that the admission of an in-court identification without inquiry into whether it was 
tainted by a prior lineup conducted in the absence of counsel in violation of the Sixth 
Amendment was also constitutional error. See Gilbert v. California, 388 U.S. 263, 271–74 
(1967). 
 27 See Kirby v. Illinois, 406 U.S. 682, 688–90 (1972) (plurality opinion); id. at 691 
(Powell, J., concurring in the result). 
 28 See United States v. Ash, 413 U.S. 300, 313–21 (1973). 
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procedures means that the attorney would have few tools available to ensure 
that reliable procedures are employed.29 
A more straightforward approach to reducing the risk of error created 
by unreliable eyewitness identifications would involve regulating the process 
of eyewitness identification itself to reduce the risk of error.  Indeed, there is 
a line of cases that points in that direction, beginning with the Supreme 
Court’s decision—announced the same day as Wade—in Stovall v. Denno.30 
Stovall, the suspect in the case, was brought to the hospital room of a 
stabbing victim in the custody of police officers—Mrs. Behrendt—who 
identified him as the individual who had attacked her and killed her 
husband.31  While acknowledging that an identification of an alleged 
perpetrator could be “so unnecessarily suggestive and conducive to 
irreparable mistaken identification that he was denied due process of law[,]” 
the Court concluded that “a claimed violation of due process of law in the 
conduct of a confrontation depends on the totality of the circumstances 
surrounding it, and the record in the present case reveals that the showing of 
Stovall to Mrs. Behrendt in an immediate hospital confrontation was 
imperative.”32  After all, “[n]o one knew how long Mrs. Behrendt might 
live.”33  Stovall’s implication was that the use of evidence derived from an 
unnecessarily suggestive identification procedure could deprive the accused 
of due process of law.  Subsequent cases, even as they rejected due process 
claims, continued to leave open that possibility.34 
 
 29 Cf. Donald A. Dripps, Miscarriages of Justice and the Constitution, 2 BUFF. CRIM. L. 
REV. 635, 656 (1999) (“[T]he right to counsel approach does not focus on the underlying 
problems with the reliability of the evidence. Giving the suspect a lawyer before a lineup 
does . . . what? The lawyer can testify as a witness about suggestiveness later on, but any 
accurate recording of the session could achieve that much.”) (ellipsis in original and footnote 
omitted); Garrett, supra note 15, at 466–67 (“[H]aving the right to a lawyer present at a lineup 
is not a significant protection . . . . At best, it may discourage police from making any 
obviously suggestive cues during the lineup itself, though with the cost of potentially turning 
the lawyer into a trial witness disqualified from further representation.”); Louis Michael 
Seidman, Soldiers, Martyrs, and Criminals: Utilitarian Theory and the Problem of Crime 
Control, 94 YALE L.J. 315, 328 (1984) (“The presence of an attorney at certain identification 
procedures enhances the illusion of accuracy while doing little to remedy the problems 
identified by perceptual psychologists.”). 
 30 388 U.S. 293 (1967). 
 31 Id. at 295. 
 32 Id. at 302. 
 33 Id. (quoting United States ex rel. Stovall v. Denno, 355 F.2d 731, 735 (2d Cir. 1966), 
aff’d sub nom. Stovall v. Denno, 388 U.S. 293 (1967)). 
 34 See, e.g., Simmons v. United States, 390 U.S. 377, 384–85 (1968) (upholding use of 
identifications of photographs of suspects by observing that “it is not suggested that it was 
unnecessary for the FBI to resort to photographic identification” since “the perpetrators were 
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Stovall’s implication became a square holding in Foster v. California.35  
In that case, the sole witness to a robbery viewed Foster in a three-person 
lineup in which Foster was much taller than the fillers and wore a jacket 
similar to the one the witness had seen the robber wearing, yet the witness 
was unable to make a positive identification then, or at a subsequent showup 
that only included Foster; but she finally identified Foster at a second lineup, 
in which Foster was the only individual who had also appeared in the first 
one.36  Citing Stovall, the Court wrote: “[t]he suggestive elements in this 
identification procedure made it all but inevitable that [the witness] would 
identify [Foster] whether or not he was in fact ‘the man.’ . . . This procedure 
so undermined the reliability of the eyewitness identification as to violate due 
process.”37 
Foster established that a conviction resting on evidence derived from 
unnecessarily suggestive identifications could deprive an accused of the right 
to a fair trial under the Due Process Clause.  The limits of this holding, 
however, became clear in Manson. 
2. The Holding in Manson 
The facts of Manson were straightforward.  After an undercover police 
officer provided narcotics officers with a description of the individual who 
had just sold him heroin, a photograph was left on the undercover officer’s 
desk, and two days later the officer identified the photograph as depicting the 
seller.38  While the majority conceded that “the procedure in the instant case 
was suggestive because only one photograph was used and 
unnecessary because there was no emergency or exigent circumstance,”39 the 
Court rejected the view that evidence obtained through unnecessarily 
suggestive procedures “automatically is to be excluded.”40  The Court 
reasoned that “[t]he standard, after all, is that of fairness required by the Due 
Process Clause,” and, therefore, courts must consider “the totality of the 
circumstances.”41  For the Court, “reliability is the linchpin in determining 
 
still at large,” and adding that “there was in the circumstances of this case little chance that 
the procedure utilized led to misidentification of Simmons”). 
 35 394 U.S. 440 (1969). 
 36 Id. at 441–42. 
 37 Id. at 443. 
 38 Manson v. Brathwaite, 432 U.S. 98, 99–101 (1977). 
 39 Id. at 109 (citations and internal quotations omitted). 
 40 Id. at 113. 
 41 Id. (citation and internal quotations omitted). 
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the admissibility of identification testimony”42 and, when assessing 
reliability, the relevant factors 
include the opportunity of the witness to view the criminal at the time of the crime, the 
witness’ degree of attention, the accuracy of his prior description of the criminal, the 
level of certainty demonstrated at the confrontation, and the time between the crime 
and the confrontation. Against these factors is to be weighed the corrupting effect of 
the suggestive identification itself.43 
Applying those factors, the Court wrote that the identification enjoyed 
adequate indicia of reliability,44 adding that “we cannot say that under all the 
circumstances of this case there is ‘a very substantial likelihood of irreparable 
misidentification.’”45 
3. The Critique of Manson 
Even though Manson’s requirement of reliability review for proffered 
eyewitness identification evidence produced by potentially suggestive 
procedures represents a break from the general rule that the reliability of 
otherwise relevant evidence should be assessed by the trier of fact, Manson 
has been subject to fierce criticism for failing to erect an adequate barrier to 
the admission of unreliable identifications. 
Perhaps the primary ground of attack is that Manson’s account of 
reliability is inconsistent with the growing body of research studying the 
reliability of eyewitness identifications.  For example, commentators have 
argued that Manson’s direction to assess reliability in light of the witness’s 
initial description of the suspect is inconsistent with subsequent research 
finding little correlation between the accuracy of a suspect’s initial 
 
 42 Id. at 114. To support this novel requirement of judicial inquiry into the reliability of 
proffered evidence in the face of official suggestion, the Court cited Neil v. Biggers, 409 U.S. 
188 (1972). Manson, 432 U.S. at 114. In Neil, the Court had upheld the use of a showup 
identification of the suspect by concluding that the identification “was reliable even though 
the confrontation procedure was suggestive.” See Neil, 409 U.S. at 199–201. As the Court 
acknowledged in Manson, however, Neil’s precise holding did not control since, in that case, 
“the challenged procedure occurred pre-Stovall and that a strict rule would make little sense 
with regard to a confrontation that preceded the Court’s first indication that a suggestive 
procedure might lead to the exclusion of evidence. One perhaps might argue that, by 
implication, the Court suggested that a different rule could apply post-Stovall.” Manson, 432 
U.S. at 107 (citation omitted). 
 43 Manson, 432 U.S. at 114. 
 44 Id. at 114–16. 
 45 Id. at 116 (quoting Simmons v. United States, 390 U.S. 377, 384 (1968)). Subsequently 
the Court held that the Due Process Clause does not entitle an accused to a hearing outside the 
presence of the jury on the admissibility of eyewitness identification evidence. See Watkins v. 
Sowders, 449 U.S. 341, 346–49 (1981). 
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description and the accuracy of a subsequent identification.46  Similarly, 
Manson is attacked because subsequent research has disclosed that other 
factors Manson relied upon to establish reliability, such as a witness’s 
opportunity to view the perpetrator, degree of certainty, and degree of 
attention, are often difficult to assess and are themselves subject to 
manipulation by suggestive identification procedures.47  Critics also charge 
that Manson’s multi-factor test permits courts to admit eyewitness 
identification evidence even when critical factors identified in the research 
suggest a heightened risk of unreliability, such as when the witness had a 
poor opportunity to view the perpetrator or made an identification after 
substantial time has passed.48  Some add that Manson ignores research 
disclosing the special risks of cross-racial identifications,49 the risk of error 
created by the tendency of witnesses to focus on the presence of weapons,50 
the stress of witnessing a violent crime,51 or the special risks in identifications 
by child or juvenile witnesses.52 
Beyond Manson’s claimed inconsistency with the pertinent social 
science research, critics argue that Manson’s focus on reliability encourages 
courts to overlook unnecessarily suggestive identification procedures if they 
are convinced the defendant is guilty.53  And critics also contend that the 
reliability review contemplated by Manson is insufficiently protective of the 
innocent because it permits unreliable identifications to be admitted in 
evidence as long as the suggestion can be characterized as somehow 
necessary to the investigation.54 
 
 46 See, e.g., GARRETT, supra note 15, at 69–70; Sonenshein & Nilon, supra note 6, at 276. 
 47 See, e.g., GARRETT, supra note 15, at 71–72; Thompson, supra note 15, at 610–11, 613; 
Kahn-Fogel, supra note 14, at 115–17; Rosenberg, supra note 15, at 276–79; Sonenshein & 
Nilon, supra note 6, at 275–76, 277; Wise et al., supra note 15, at 815–16, 817–18. 
 48 See, e.g., GARRETT, supra note 15, at 70–71, 72; Sonenshein & Nilon, supra note 6, at 
277–78. 
 49 See, e.g., GARRETT, supra note 15, at 72–74; Thompson, supra note 15, at 605–06, 613; 
Kahn-Fogel, supra note 14, at 117; Rosenberg, supra note 15, at 279. 
 50 See, e.g., Thompson, supra note 15, at 613; Kahn-Fogel, supra note 14, at 117; 
Rosenberg, supra note 15, at 279–80. 
 51 See, e.g., Thompson, supra note 15, at 616, 618; Kahn-Fogel, supra note 14, at 117; 
Rosenberg, supra note 15, at 278. 
 52 See, e.g., GARRETT, supra note 15, at 75–77. 
 53 See, e.g., Brandon L. Garrett, Innocence, Harmless Error, and Federal Wrongful 
Conviction Law, 2005 WIS. L. REV. 35, 83–85. 
 54 See, e.g., Thompson, supra note 15, at 610, 614–16. Although Manson contained no 
square holding on this precise point, the Court subsequently held that a defendant may not 
challenge the admission of eyewitness identification evidence without establishing 
unnecessarily suggestive police conduct. See Perry v. New Hampshire, 565 U.S. 228, 240–48 
(2012). 
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B. STATE-LAW ALTERNATIVES TO MANSON 
Despite the manifold attacks on Manson, as we have seen, its approach 
to the admission of eyewitness identification evidence continues to be 
followed by the vast majority of jurisdictions.55  The courts in some 
jurisdictions, however, have taken a different road.56 
1. Henderson and its Progeny 
Likely the leading example of an alternative to Manson is State v. 
Henderson.57  In that case, the New Jersey Supreme Court reviewed research 
demonstrating the large risk of error in eyewitness identifications, the 
increased risk of error that may result from the manner in which identification 
procedures are conducted (“systems variables”), and the circumstances under 
which the witness viewed the subject (“estimator variables”), as well as the 
risk that the jurors do not appreciate the risks of misidentification.58  While 
acknowledging that “[w]e have no authority, of course, to modify Manson,” 
the New Jersey Supreme Court rested its decision on the due process rights 
guaranteed by the state constitution.59  The court held that when a defendant 
can discharge “the initial burden of showing some evidence of 
suggestiveness that could lead to a mistaken identification,”60 the burden of 
proof shifts to the prosecution “to show that the proffered eyewitness 
 
 55 See supra note 14 and accompanying text. 
 56 Some jurisdictions that have undertaken legislative or administrative reforms in 
identification procedures that do not call for the exclusion of evidence obtained in violation of 
recommended procedures. For a helpful discussion of these reforms, see Keith A. Findley, 
Implementing the Lessons from Wrongful Convictions: An Empirical Analysis of Eyewitness 
Identification Reform Strategies, 81 MO. L. REV. 377, 411–51 (2016). 
 57 27 A.3d 872 (N.J. 2011). 
 58 Id. at 894–912. 
 59 Id. at 919, n.10. 
 60 Id. at 920. The court added that “concerns about estimator variables alone cannot trigger 
a pretrial hearing; only system variables would.” Id. at 922. To support this conclusion, the 
court reasoned that “eyewitness identification evidence will likely not be ruled inadmissible 
at pretrial hearings solely on account of estimator variables,” “courts cannot affect estimator 
variables; by definition, they relate to matters outside the control of law enforcement,” 
“suggestive behavior can distort various other factors that are weighed in assessing reliability. 
That warrants a greater pretrial focus on system variables,” and, finally, that “to allow hearings 
in the majority of identification cases might overwhelm the system with little resulting 
benefit.” Id. at 923. In a companion case involving a suggestive identification involving no 
official conduct, the court “ma[d]e one modification to Henderson in applying it to cases 
where there is no police action: we require a higher, initial threshold of suggestiveness to 
trigger a hearing, namely, some evidence of highly suggestive circumstances as opposed to 
simply suggestive conduct.” State v. Chen, 27 A.3d 930, 942–43 (N.J. 2011). In this sense, 
the court apparently prioritized regulating investigative conduct over policing the reliability 
of evidence. As we will see, policing the reliability of evidence is a fraught enterprise. 
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identification is reliable—accounting for system and estimator 
variables . . . .”61  The court identified the relevant “system” variables to be 
such considerations as whether there was blind administration of the 
identification procedure, pre-identification instructions, lineup construction, 
feedback from investigators, the witness’s degree of confidence, the number 
of viewings, whether suspects were viewed simultaneously or sequentially, 
whether the witness produced a composite sketch of the suspect prior to the 
identification procedure, and whether a showup identification took place.62  
The court identified the relevant “estimator” variables as whether the witness 
was under stress at the time of the underlying events, whether a visible 
weapon was used, the duration of the witness’s opportunity to view the 
perpetrator during the underlying events, distance and lighting at that time, 
the witness’s age and level of intoxication during the underlying events, the 
perpetrator’s age, the perpetrator’s characteristics, the time elapsed between 
the underlying events and the identification, whether cross-racial 
identification is involved, whether multiple witnesses could have 
contaminated an identification, and the speed of the identification.63 
 
 61 Henderson, 27 A.3d at 920. Although the pertinent federal and state constitutional 
provisions employ somewhat different formulations, there is no apparent textual basis that 
explains the New Jersey Supreme Court’s decision to impose more stringent requirements 
than are found in Manson. Compare N.J. CONST. art. I, § 1 (“All persons are by nature free 
and independent, and have certain natural and unalienable rights, among which are those of 
enjoying and defending life and liberty, of acquiring, possessing, and protecting property, and 
of pursuing and obtaining safety and happiness.”), with U.S. CONST. amend. XIV, § 1 (“No 
State shall . . . deprive any person of life, liberty, or property, without due process of law.”). 
Moreover, in Henderson, the court relied on its supervisory power over the administration of 
justice to require that law enforcement officers “make a full record—written or otherwise—
of the witness’ statement of confidence once an identification is made,” 27 A.3d at 900, and 
that “police officers ask witnesses, as part of the identification process, questions designed to 
elicit (a) whether the witness has spoken with anyone about the identification and, if so, (b) 
what was discussed. That information should be recorded and disclosed to defendants.” Id. at 
909. It is accordingly difficult to read Henderson as being rooted in the peculiarities of New 
Jersey law. Instead, it seems to reflect the court’s disagreement with Manson’s approach. 
 62 Henderson, 27 A.3d at 896–903. 
 63 Id. at 904–10. The court also directed that “enhanced instructions be given to guide 
juries about the various factors that may affect the reliability of an identification in a particular 
case.” Id. at 924. In another decision announced on the same day, the court added: “[W]e make 
one modification to Henderson in applying it to cases where there is no police action: we 
require a higher, initial threshold of suggestiveness to trigger a hearing, namely, some 
evidence of highly suggestive circumstances as opposed to simply suggestive conduct.” Chen, 
27 A.3d at 942–43. 
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Henderson has received fulsome praise from commentators.64  It has 
influenced other jurisdictions as well.  In State v. Lawson,65 for example, the 
Oregon Supreme Court, relying in significant part on Henderson,66 
interpreted its rules of evidence to require that when there is evidence of 
police suggestion, “the state—as the proponent of the identification—must 
establish by a preponderance of the evidence that the identification was based 
on a permissible basis rather than an impermissible one, such as suggestive 
police procedures.”67  Even when the state discharges this burden, a court 
may nevertheless find that “the probative value of the evidence is 
substantially outweighed by the danger of unfair prejudice, confusion of the 
issues, misleading the jury, or by considerations of undue delay or needless 
presentation of cumulative evidence.”68  Subsequently, the Alaska Supreme 
Court, relying on its supervisory power over the administration of criminal 
justice as well as Henderson, held that when a defendant adduces evidence 
of official suggestiveness, a trial court must hold an evidentiary hearing and 
consider evidence on all relevant system and estimator variables.69  Similarly, 
the Connecticut Supreme Court adopted Henderson’s holding as an 
interpretation of the Connecticut Constitution’s due process clause.70 
 
 64 See, e.g., Keith A. Findley, Judicial Gatekeeping of Suspect Evidence: Due Process and 
Evidentiary Rules in the Age of Innocence, 47 GA. L. REV. 723, 738–51 (2013); GARRETT, 
supra note 15, at 493–94; Barry Scheck, Four Reforms for the Twenty-First Century, 96 
JUDICATURE 323, 333–36 (2013); Wells, supra note 4, at 275; Robert Couch, Comment, A 
Model for Fixing Identification Evidence after Perry v. New Hampshire, 111 MICH. L. REV. 
1535, 1542–46 (2013); Amy D. Trenary, Comment, State v. Henderson: A Model for 
Admitting Eyewitness Identification Testimony, 84 U. COLO. L. REV. 1257, 1295–300 (2013); 
Dana Walsh, Note, The Dangers of Eyewitness Identification: A Call for Greater State 
Involvement To Ensure Fundamental Fairness, 36 B.C. INT’L & COMP. L. REV. 1415, 1449–
53 (2013). 
 65 291 P.3d 673 (Or. 2012). 
 66 Id. at 685 n.3. 
 67 Id. at 693. The court based its holding on the requirements in the Oregon Rules of 
Evidence that lay opinion testimony be rationally based on the witness’s perceptions, helpful 
to the trier of fact, and not unfairly prejudicial, reasoning that suggestive identifications are in 
tension with these requirements. Id. at 693–95. Given that the Manson Court regarded its 
approach as placing only reliable evidence before the jury, like Henderson, it is difficult to 
understand Lawson as based on some peculiarity of state law as opposed to a substantive 
disagreement with Manson. 
 68 Id. at 697. The court added that expert testimony is appropriate to inform the trier of 
fact about the variables that can affect the reliability of identification testimony. Id. at 695–
96. 
 69 See Young v. State, 374 P.3d 395, 412–28 (Alaska 2016). 
 70 See State v. Harris, 191 A.3d 119, 133–47 (Conn. 2018). With respect to the estimator 
variables to be employed in assessing reliability, the court indicated that “the trial court should 
consider the eight estimator variables that this court identified in State v. Guilbert, [49 A.3d 
705 (Conn. 2012)], which overlap considerably with the estimator variables identified in 
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2. Per se Exclusionary Rules 
Some jurisdictions have adopted approaches even more skeptical of 
eyewitness identification evidence.  The highest courts in Massachusetts and 
New York, for example, have embraced a per se rule of exclusion of any 
identification resulting from the use an unnecessarily suggestive 
identification procedure under the due process clauses of their state 
constitutions.71  The Wisconsin Supreme Court once held that because 
showup identifications are suggestive, evidence resulting from them should 
be suppressed absent a showing that the procedure was necessary, although 
it later retreated from that view.72  A number of commentators have also 
embraced robust rules of exclusion when identifications are made through 
unnecessarily suggestive procedures.73 
 
Henderson. As we recognized in Guilbert, these variables are neither ‘exclusive’ nor ‘frozen 
in time.’” Id. at 144 (footnote omitted) (citations omitted). 
 71 See Commonwealth v. Johnson, 650 N.E.2d 1257, 1259–65 (Mass. 1995); People v. 
Adams, 423 N.E.2d 379, 383–84 (N.Y. 1981). 
 72 See State v. DuBose, 699 N.W.2d 582, 591–99 (Wis. 2005), overruled by State v. 
Roberson, 935 N.W.2d 813 (Wis. 2019). 
 73 See, e.g., Dripps, supra note 29, at 657–64 (requiring exclusion unless identification 
procedures comport with best practices and permitting defense counsel to participate when the 
suspect is in custody); Susan R. Klein, Identifying and (Re)Formulating Prophylactic Rules, 
Safe Harbors, and Incidental Rights in Constitutional Criminal Procedure, 99 MICH. L. REV. 
1030, 1064–65 (2001) (advocating prophylactic rules requiring the use of non-suggestive 
procedures for identifications); Margery Malkin Koosed, Reforming Eyewitness Identification 
Law and Practices To Protect the Innocent, 42 CREIGHTON L. REV. 595, 624–31 (2009) 
(advocating exclusion of all identifications obtained through suggestive procedures); Robert 
P. Mosteller, The Duke Lacrosse Case, Innocence, and False Identifications: A Fundamental 
Failure to “Do Justice”, 76 FORDHAM L. REV. 1337, 1408–12 (2007) (advocating per se 
exclusion of identifications obtained without complying with procedures designed to 
minimize suggestiveness); O’Toole & Shay, supra note 15, at 136–44 (advocating use of 
prophylactic guidelines reflecting best practices identified through empirical research); Chase 
T. Rogers, Putting Meat on Constitutional Bones: The Authority of State Courts to Craft 
Prophylactic Rules under the Federal Constitution, 98 B.U. L. REV. 541, 573–77 (2018) 
(advocating prophylactic rules governing the admissibility of in-court identifications of the 
defendant); Rosenberg, supra note 15, at 297–314 (advocating per se exclusion of 
identifications obtained through unnecessarily suggestive procedures and exclusion of 
identifications obtained through other suggestive procedures unless they satisfy a proposed 
standard of probativeness, and guaranteeing the defense a right to expert testimony on 
eyewitness identification); Wise et al., supra note 15, at 842–65, 868–71 (advocating use of 
prophylactic guidelines reflecting best practices identified through empirical research); 
Suedabeh Walker, Comment, Drawing on Daubert: Bringing Reliability to the Forefront in 
the Admissibility of Eyewitness Identification Evidence, 62 EMORY L.J. 1205, 1234–41 (2013) 
(advocating heightened reliability screening for identification evidence); see also GARRETT, 
supra note 15, at 488–91 (advocating exclusion of in-court identifications of the defendant as 
impermissibly suggestive); Evan J. Mandery, Due Process Considerations of In-Court 
Identifications, 60 ALB. L. REV. 389, 420–21 (1996). 
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3. Incremental Reforms 
Other states have undertaken more modest reforms.  The Utah Supreme 
Court has interpreted the due process clause of its state constitution to require 
that reliability be assessed not merely in light of the factors mentioned in 
Manson, but instead by reference to all factors that have been shown to affect 
the reliability of an identification.74  The Kansas Supreme Court subsequently 
followed Utah’s approach.75  The Maine Supreme Court has held that even 
when there has been no showing of unnecessary official suggestion, Maine’s 
rules of evidence require a court to determine whether an identification is 
reliable.76  By statute, North Carolina regulates identification procedures to 
minimize the risk of suggestiveness—requiring, in particular, that lineups be 
conducted by blind administrators when practicable, the sequential 
presentation of suspects, and the use of fillers that match the suspect’s 
description.77  Additionally, the statute authorizes courts to suppress 
identification evidence obtained without complying with the statutory 
requirements.78  Ohio has enacted a more limited statute requiring the use of 
blind administrators when practicable, and permitting courts to suppress 
identification evidence obtained in violation of the statute.79 
C. THE LIMITED SIGNIFICANCE OF THE STATE-LAW 
ALTERNATIVES TO MANSON 
It is unclear whether the limitations on the admissibility of eyewitness 
identification evidence that various states have adopted have much in the way 
of teeth.  Indeed, there is reason to believe that they will rarely result in the 
exclusion of evidence. 
1. Henderson and its Progeny 
Consider again Henderson.  Even as it adopted what purported to be a 
more robust rule of exclusion than Manson, Henderson cautioned, “[I]n the 
vast majority of cases, identification evidence will likely be presented to the 
jury. The threshold for suppression remains high.”80  Then, citing Manson, 
the court added that “the ultimate burden remains on the defendant to prove 
 
 74 See State v. Ramirez, 817 P.2d 774, 779–81 (Utah 1991). 
 75 See State v. Hunt, 69 P.3d 571, 573–77 (Kan. 2016). 
 76 See State v. Davis, 191 A.3d 1147, 1155–57 (Me. 2018). 
 77 Id. 
 78 See N.C. GEN STAT. ANN. § 15A-284.52 (West 2016). 
 79 See OHIO REV. CODE ANN. § 2933.83 (West 2016). 
 80 State v. Henderson, 27 A.3d 872, 928 (N.J. 2011). 
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a very substantial likelihood of irreparable misidentification.”81  That sounds 
a great deal like Manson, which rejected suppression absent “a very 
substantial likelihood of irreparable misidentification.”82  That is reason 
enough to question the practical significance of Henderson.  Indeed, the facts 
and actual outcome of the Henderson litigation illustrate its limited 
significance. 
Start with the facts.  After Rodney Harper and James Womble spent 
New Year’s Eve drinking wine and champagne and smoking crack cocaine 
in the apartment of Womble’s girlfriend, Harper left the apartment around 
10:15 P.M., returning around 2:00 A.M., and soon after his return, two men 
forced their way inside.83  Womble knew one of them, George Clark, who 
took Harper into another room while the stranger trained a gun on Womble, 
telling him, “Don’t move, stay right here, you’re not involved in this.”84  
Womble “remained with the stranger in a small, narrow, dark hallway,” and 
later “testified that he ‘got a look at’ the stranger, but not ‘a real good 
look.’”85  Womble then overheard an argument between Clark and Harper in 
the other room, followed by a gunshot.86  Womble walked into the room, saw 
Clark holding a handgun, and “[a]s Clark left, he warned Womble, ‘Don’t rat 
me out, I know where you live.’”87 
On January 11, Detective Luis Ruiz and Investigator Randall MacNair 
interviewed Womble, who told them that while he was in the apartment, he 
heard two gunshots outside, and then found Harper slumped over his car in a 
nearby parking lot, where Harper told Womble that he had been shot by two 
men he did not know.88  The next day, the officers confronted Womble with 
inconsistencies in his story, and Womble claimed that the officers threatened 
to charge him in connection with the murder.89  Womble “admitted that he 
lied at first because he did not want to ‘rat’ out anyone and ‘didn’t want to 
get involved’ out of fear of retaliation against his elderly father.”90  Womble 
 
 81 Id. at 920. 
 82 Manson v. Brathwaite, 432 U.S. 98, 116 (1977) (internal quotation and citation 
omitted). 
 83 Henderson, 27 A.3d at 879. 
 84 Id. 
 85 Id. 
 86 Id. 
 87 Id. In particular, the evidence at the ensuing trial was, “Womble smoked two bags of 
crack cocaine with his girlfriend in the hours before the shooting; the two also consumed one 
bottle of champagne and one bottle of wine; the lighting was ‘pretty dark’ in the hallway where 
Womble and [Henderson] interacted . . . .” Id. at 882. 
 88 Id. 
 89 Id. 
 90 Id. 
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then “led the investigators to Clark,” who ultimately gave a statement and 
identified his confederate as Larry Henderson.91 
On January 14, Womble viewed a photo array at the prosecutor’s office 
conducted by Detective Thomas Weber pursuant to guidelines issued by the 
New Jersey Attorney General providing that “primary investigators should 
not administer photo or live lineup identification procedures ‘to ensure that 
inadvertent verbal cues or body language do not impact on a witness.’”92  The 
array consisted of seven “filler” photos and one photo of Henderson.93 
After viewing the array, Womble eliminated six photos, but “said he 
‘wasn’t 100 percent sure of the final two pictures.’”94  Detective Weber left 
the room and told Inspector MacNair and Detective Ruiz that Womble could 
not make a final identification, and at that point, MacNair and Ruiz entered 
the interview room believing, according to MacNair’s subsequent testimony, 
that Womble “was holding back—as he had earlier in the investigation—
based on fear.”95  Inspector MacNair testified that he “just told him to focus, 
to calm down, to relax and that any type of protection that [he] would need, 
any threats against [him] would be put to rest by the Police Department,” and 
Detective Ruiz told Womble to “just do what you have to do, and we’ll be 
out of here.”96  According to MacNair’s testimony, at that point Womble said 
he “could make [an] identification.”97  MacNair and Ruiz then left the 
interview room, and Weber returned and again displayed the photos to 
Womble sequentially, but this time, when Womble saw Henderson’s photo, 
he made an identification.98  Womble never recanted that identification, 
although he later testified that “he felt as though Detective Weber was 
‘nudging’ him to choose [Henderson]’s photo, and ‘that there was pressure’ 
to make a choice.”99 
 
 91 Id. at 879–80. Specifically, Womble “advised that the man who shot Harper was known 
as ‘Bubbles,’ and he indicated where ‘Bubbles’ lived. A database search of this address 
generated a photograph of co-defendant Clark, whom Womble positively identified as 
‘Bubbles.’” State v. Henderson, 937 A.2d 988, 992 (N.J. Super. Ct. App. Div. 2008), aff’d as 
modified, 27 A.3d 872 (N.J. 2011). 
 92 27 A.3d at 880 (internal quotation and citation omitted). 
 93 Id. All of the photos were headshots of African American men between the ages of 
twenty-eight and thirty-five, with short hair, goatees, and, according to Weber, possessing 
similar facial features. Id. 
 94 Id. 
 95 Id. 
 96 Id. 
 97 Id. 
 98 Id. 
 99 Id. 
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After the New Jersey Supreme Court’s decision in Henderson, on 
remand the trial court conducted a hearing, made findings regarding each of 
the relevant systems and estimator variables, and then denied the motion to 
suppress Womble’s identification.100  On appeal, that ruling was upheld by 
the New Jersey intermediate appellate court.101  The New Jersey Supreme 
Court denied Henderson’s petition seeking further review.102 
Viewed in terms of systems and estimator variables, this is an 
extraordinary result.  As for estimator variables, when Womble viewed the 
perpetrator, he had been drinking and smoking crack, the hallway was dark, 
the incident was brief, Womble equivocated about whether he had a good 
look at the perpetrator, the lineup did not occur until two weeks after the 
shooting, and during the lineup, Womble was initially unable to make an 
identification.103  As for systems variables, Womble was threatened with 
prosecution after his initial statement, and Womble could not make an 
identification until after he was confronted by the same investigators who 
had previously threatened him, in contravention of applicable guidelines 
requiring blind lineup administration.104 
If an identification is deemed admissible in the face of so many systems 
and estimator variables suggesting unreliability as were present in Henderson 
itself, Henderson’s protections may prove illusory.105  At a minimum, it 
seems clear that Henderson erects a highly permeable barrier to the 
admission of identifications obtained through suggestive procedures.  In 
State v. Wright, for example, a New Jersey appellate court upheld a trial 
court’s refusal to suppress a concededly suggestive showup identification 
made after officers told the victim of an armed robbery that they had arrested 
 
 100 See State v. Henderson, 77 A.3d 536, 540–41, 545–56 (N.J. Super. Ct. App. Div. 
2013). 
 101 See id. at 546. 
 102 State v. Henderson, 91 A.3d 25 (N.J. 2014) (table). 
 103 See supra text accompanying notes 82–86. 
 104 See supra text accompanying notes 87–98. 
 105 E.g., Sandra Guerra Thompson, Daubert Gatekeeping for Eyewitness Identifications, 
65 S.M.U. L. REV. 593, 632 (2012) (“At the same time, however, the [New Jersey] cases 
exemplify courts’ continuing reluctance to implement reliability gatekeeping as a procedural 
norm. Rejecting the recommendations of the Special Master, the New Jersey high court 
established lofty burdens for defendants to even obtain pretrial hearings, downplayed the need 
for defense expert witnesses, and touted jury instructions as a cure-all.”). Notably, the 
intermediate appellate court in New Jersey has read Henderson to permit the admission in an 
armed robbery case of a showup identification of a handcuffed suspect in police custody by a 
witness who had also been told that the witness’s stolen cellphone as well as a gun had been 
recovered from the vicinity of the suspect. See State v. Wright, 133 A.3d 656, 659–60, 662–
65 (N.J. Super. Ct. App. Div. 2016). 
202 ROSENTHAL [Vol. 110 
the perpetrator.106  To be sure, Henderson is sufficiently recent that there are 
only a limited number of decisions illustrating its scope, and there are a 
handful cases in which a contested identification was suppressed under 
Henderson.107  Still, it is unclear that Henderson has substantially altered the 
admissibility of identification testimony in New Jersey.  Indeed, as we have 
seen, the Henderson standard for excluding an identification ultimately 
seems little different from the standard embraced in Manson.108 
The Oregon Supreme Court’s decision in Lawson may have little more 
in the way of teeth.  Like Henderson, Lawson cautioned that its holding is 
unlikely to lead to frequent suppression of evidence.109  Moreover, in one of 
the two cases before the court, it upheld the admission of an identification 
even though it involved a showup procedure in which robbery victims viewed 
an individual while handcuffed in the back of a police vehicle.110  
Subsequently, the court held that even when a witness identifies an individual 
for the first time in what is plainly an unnecessarily suggestive showup 
procedure—during her testimony in court—and even though she told police 
shortly after the shooting that she did not get a good look at the perpetrators, 
the showup identification was nevertheless admissible under Lawson.111 
As for Alaska law, even as it followed Henderson, the Alaska Supreme 
Court cautioned, “Although the defendant must only identify a relevant 
system variable in order to obtain a hearing, the defendant retains the burden 
of proving at that hearing a ‘very substantial likelihood of irreparable 
misidentification.’”112  Similarly, when adopting Henderson, the Connecticut 
Supreme Court emphasized that once the state “offer[s] evidence 
demonstrating that the identification was reliable,” the burden is on the 
defendant to “prove a very substantial likelihood of misidentification,” and 
added that the factors courts should consider under Henderson are “generally 
 
 106 133 A.3d 656, 662–65 (N.J. Super. Ct. App. Div. 2016); cf. State v. Pressley, 181 A.3d 
1017, 1020–21 (N.J. 2018) (upholding admission of undercover officer’s showup 
identification occurring shortly after the charged crime). 
 107 See State v. Drew, No. A-0187-17T4, 2018 WL 2339509 (N.J. Super. Ct. App. Div. 
May 24, 2018); State v. Wyles, No. A-3471-16T4, 2017 WL 4558467 (N.J. Super. Ct. App. 
Div. Oct. 13, 2017). 
 108 See supra text accompanying notes 79–81. 
 109 The court wrote: “[W]e anticipate that the trial courts will continue to admit most 
eyewitness identifications . . . . [I]t is doubtful that issues concerning one or more of the 
estimator variables that we have identified will, without more, be enough to support an 
inference of unreliability sufficient to justify the exclusion of the eyewitness identification.” 
State v. Lawson, 291 P.3d 673, 697 (Or. 2012). 
 110 Id. at 681–82, 699–700. 
 111 See State v. Hickman, 330 P.3d 551, 568–71 (Or. 2014). 
 112 Young v. State, 374 P.3d 395, 428 (Alaska 2016) (quoting State v. Henderson, 27 A.3d 
872, 920 (N.J. 2011) (citation omitted)). 
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comparable” to those employed in federal constitutional law.113  This 
suggests little in the way of meaningful departure from the Manson standard. 
Thus, there is considerable doubt as to the practical significance of the 
reforms adopted in these jurisdictions. 
2. Per se Exclusionary Rules 
Per se rules excluding suggestive identifications seemingly offer more 
certain protection against the use of suggestive identifications than cases like 
Henderson and Lawson.  There is, however, reason to doubt that those states 
that have purported to adopt per se exclusionary rules have really done so. 
For example, even though the Massachusetts Supreme Judicial Court 
purported to require the exclusion of all identification evidence obtained 
through unnecessarily suggestive procedures,114 that court later upheld the 
admission of identifications obtained by an officer who knew the identity of 
the suspect, rather than by a blind administrator—despite acknowledging that 
these procedures increase the risk of suggestion115—an identification 
obtained after a non-blind administrator told the witness that a suspect had 
been apprehended before showing the witness a photo array,116 and a showup 
identification of individuals visibly in police custody.117  All of these seem 
like unnecessarily suggestive identifications, and yet none were suppressed.  
This is not to say that, in at least some of these cases, the likely effect of the 
deviation from practices that minimize the risk of suggestion may have been 
small, but it is still hard to square the outcome in these cases with a rule that 
purports to suppress all identifications obtained through any form of 
unnecessary suggestion. 
Similarly, despite its prior holding that purported to brand as 
inadmissible all eyewitness identification evidence obtained through 
 
 113 State v. Harris, 191 A.3d 119, 131, 146 (Conn. 2018). The court added that inquiry it 
had adopted was “generally comparable to” the approach taken by federal due process doctrine 
and is “merely intended to ‘more precisely define the focus of the relevant inquiry.’” Id. at 
136 (internal quotations and citations omitted)). 
 114 See, e.g., Commonwealth v. Johnson, 650 N.E.2d 1257, 1260 (Mass. 1995) (“The rule 
of per se exclusion . . . states that the defendant bears the burden of demonstrating, by a 
preponderance of the evidence, that the ‘witness was subjected by the State to a confrontation 
that was unnecessarily suggestive and thus offensive to due process.’ If this is established, 
then the prosecution is barred from introducing that particular confrontation in evidence at 
trial.” (citations omitted) (quoting Commonwealth v. Botelho, 343 N.E.2d 876, 880 (Mass. 
1976)). 
 115 See Commonwealth v. Silva-Santiago, 906 N.E.2d 299, 311–12 (Mass. 2009). 
 116 See Commonwealth v. Watson, 915 N.E.2d 1052, 1057–60 (Mass. 2009). 
 117 See Commonwealth v. Meas, 5 N.E.3d 864, 872–73 (Mass. 2014). 
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unnecessarily suggestive procedures in People v. Adams,118 the New York 
Court of Appeals subsequently upheld the admission of a showup 
identification of a suspect handcuffed in the back of a police car who had 
already been identified by another witness, despite acknowledging that this 
procedure “[wa]s suggestive and not preferred.  It presses judicial tolerance 
to its limits.”119  In another case, the court upheld the use of a showup 
procedure in which the suspect was in custody and the identification was 
made in the presence of other witnesses, despite acknowledging that “the 
better practice when feasible is not to conduct a showup before a group of 
witnesses, procedures that are less than ideal may . . . be tolerable in the 
interest of prompt identification.”120 
In Massachusetts and New York, in short, it seems that a rule requiring 
the suppression of any unnecessarily suggestive identification has merely 
meant that those courts will find a great deal of suggestion as necessary.  As 
for Wisconsin’s supreme court, the court has even more plainly retreated 
from a rule that would require the suppression of unnecessarily suggestive 
identifications.  While seeming to find all unnecessarily suggestive 
identifications as inadmissible in its earlier decision in State v. DuBose,121 
the court subsequently held this rule inapplicable to suggestive 
identifications made through photographic arrays,122 suggestive 
identifications not arranged by the authorities,123 and suggestive 
identifications that occur during judicial proceedings.124  In light of these 
developments, DuBose seemed ripe for overruling.  That is indeed what the 
Wisconsin Supreme Court eventually did, finding Dubose unwarranted and 
in irreconcilable tension with subsequent Wisconsin precedents.125 
3. Incremental Reforms 
As for the rule adopted by the Utah Supreme Court, it is unclear that it 
differs from Manson.  In terms that seem to track Manson, the court explained 
 
 118 423 N.E.2d 379, 383–84 (N.Y. 1981) (“Permitting the prosecutor to 
introduce evidence of a suggestive pretrial identification can only increase the risks of 
convicting the innocent . . . . [I]f the jury finds the in-court identification not entirely 
convincing it should not be permitted to resolve its doubts by relying on the fact that the 
witness had identified the defendant on a prior occasion if that identification was made under 
inherently suggestive circumstances.”). 
 119 People v. Duuvon, 571 N.E.2d 654, 656–57 (N.Y. 1991). 
 120 People v. Love, 443 N.E.2d 948, 949 (N.Y. 1982) (memorandum) (citation omitted). 
 121 699 N.W.2d 582, 591–99 (Wis. 2005). 
 122 See State v. Drew, 740 N.W.2d 404, 406–09 (Wis. 2007). 
 123 See State v. Hibl, 714 N.W.2d 194, 199–202 (Wis. 2006). 
 124 See State v. Ziegler, 816 N.W.2d 238, 256–58 (Wis. 2012). 
 125 See State v. Roberson, 935 N.W.2d 813, 825–28 (Wis. 2019). 
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that its test “is whether, under the totality of the circumstances, the 
identifications were reliable.”126  The supreme courts of Kansas and Maine, 
while expanding the scope of reliability review, have embraced the same 
totality-of-the-circumstances test.127  Moreover, the law in these states has 
proven no obstacle to the admission of showup identifications in which a 
victim who has witnessed a violent crime is asked to identify a suspect visibly 
in police custody.128  As with Manson, this approach permits the use of 
identifications obtained even through unnecessarily suggestive procedures if 
a court, with the benefit of hindsight, is willing to deem them reliable. 
The North Carolina and Ohio statutes also provide quite limited 
protections.  In North Carolina, there is no authority that permits suppression 
of an identification as long as the trier of fact is made aware of the statutory 
violation.129  Thus far, the Ohio statute has had even less effect; the 
intermediate appellate court has interpreted the statute to require suppression 
under what is effectively the Manson standard—when “the identification 
procedure used was so impermissibly suggestive as to give rise to a very 
substantial likelihood of misidentification.”130 
Thus, exclusionary rules that purport to depart from Manson have not 
traveled very far.131  Even these limited reforms, however, have been rejected 
by most jurisdictions.  Most courts, when invited to depart from Manson as 
a matter of state law, have declined to do so.132  Indeed, Manson’s reliability 
 
 126 State v. Guzman, 133 P.3d 363, 367–68 (Utah 2006) (quoting State v. Hubbard, 48 
P.3d 953, 963 (Utah 2002) (footnote omitted)). 
 127 See State v. Corbett, 130 P.3d 1179, 1190–91 (Kan. 2006); State v. Trammell, 92 P.3d 
1101, 1107–08 (Kan. 2004); State v. Davis, 191 A.3d 1147, 1155–57 (Me. 2018). 
 128 See, e.g., State v. Cruz, 307 P.3d 199, 203–04, 208–11 (Kan. 2013) (murder); State v. 
Hoffhine, 20 P.3d 265, 266–69 (Utah 2001) (armed robbery); cf. State v. Davis, 191 A.3d 
1147, 1155–57 (Me. 2018) (witness had seen booking photo of defendant published in a local 
newspaper reporting on defendant’ arrest prior to making identification). 
 129 See, e.g., State v. Stowes, 727 S.E.2d 351, 357–58 (N.C. Ct. App. 2012); State v. 
Howie, No. COA13-553, 2014 WL1047373 at **9–10 (N.C. Ct. App. Mar. 18, 2014). 
 130 State v. Shaw, 4 N.E.3d 406, 420 (Ohio Ct. App. 2013). 
 131 For a similar assessment of the limited significance of the departures from Manson 
undertaken in some states, see Kahn-Fogel, supra note 14, at 160–62. 
 132 See, e.g., Small v. State, 211 A.3d 236, 244–47 (Md. Ct. App. 2019) (declining to 
follow Henderson); Smiley v. State, 111 A.3d 43, 51–52 (Md. 2015) (same); Batiste v. State, 
121 So. 3d 808, 855 n.7 (Miss. 2013) (same); People v. Blevins, 886 N.W.2d 456, 462 (Mich. 
Ct. App. 2016) (same); State v. Moore, No. COA 15-52, 2015 WL 4898121 at *4 (N.C. Ct. 
App. Aug. 18, 2015) (same); State v. Discola, 184 A.3d 1177, 1187–89, 1189 n.5 (Vt. 2018) 
(declining to follow Massachusetts and New York law). 
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test for the admission of suggestive eyewitness identification evidence is 
utilized by the courts of some forty-one states and the District of Columbia.133 
To what should we attribute the continued vitality of Manson, despite 
the many attacks launched against it?  Stare decisis is not a satisfactory 
answer.  As we have seen, Manson’s approach is utilized even by state courts 
when applying state law, despite the fact that Manson’s holding on the scope 
of the federal constitutional bar on the admission of eyewitness identification 
evidence does not prevent state courts from adopting broader rules of 
exclusion as a matter of state law.134  It is to that question that we now turn. 
II. THE DIFFICULTIES OF BLACKSTONIAN REFORM 
Perhaps the most obvious difficulty a court faces when deciding 
whether to adopt a more robust gatekeeping role for eyewitness identification 
evidence is identifying a superior alternative to Manson.  The costs and 
benefits of a different approach to gatekeeping are difficult to assess. 
 
 133 See Ex parte Frazier, 729 So. 2d 253, 257 (Ala. 1998); State v. Rojo-Valenzuela, 352 
P.3d 917, 919–20 (Ariz. 2015); Kellensworth v. State, 644 S.W.2d 933, 935–36 (Ark. 1983); 
People v. Cunningham, 25 P.3d 519, 560–61 (Cal. 2001); Bernal v. People, 44 P.3d 184, 190–
92 (Colo. 2002); Younger v. State, 496 A.2d 546, 550–51 (Del. 1985); Fields v. United States, 
484 A.2d 570, 574–75 (D.C.1984); Grant v. Florida, 390 So. 2d 341, 343 (Fla. 1980); Gravitt 
v. State, 239 S.E.2d 149, 150–51 (Ga. 1977); State v. Masaniai, 628 P.2d 1018, 1024–26 
(Haw. 1981); State v. Buti, 964 P.2d 660, 665–66 (Idaho 1998); People v. Manion, 367 N.E.2d 
1313, 1316–17 (Ill. 1977); Slaton v. State, 510 N.E.2d 1343, 1348–49 (Ind. 1987); State v. 
Neal, 353 N.W.2d 83, 86–87 (Iowa 1984); Moore v. Commonwealth, 569 S.W.2d 150, 153–
54 (Ky. 1978); State v. Brown, 907 So. 2d 1, 16–18 (La. 2005); Webster v. State, 474 A.2d 
1305, 1314–16 (Md. 1984); People v. Thomas, 902 N.W.2d 885, 886–87 (Mich. 2017) (order); 
State v. Ostrem, 535 N.W.2d 916, 921–22 (Minn. 1995); York v. State, 413 So. 2d 1372, 
1382–84 (Miss. 1982); State v. Weaver, 912 S.W.2d 499, 520–21 (Mo. 1996); State v. 
Pendergrass, 586 P.2d 691, 695–96 (Mont. 1978); State v. Nolt, 906 N.W.2d 309, 322–23 
(Neb. 2018); Gehrke v. State, 613 P.2d 1028, 1029 (Nev. 1980); State v. LaRose, 497 A.2d 
1224, 1228–29 (N.H. 1985); Patterson v. LeMaster, 21 P.3d 1032, 1037–39 (N.M. 2001); State 
v. Harris, 301 S.E.2d 91, 95-96 (N.C. 1983); State v. Juene, No. COA18-526, 2019 WL 
189866 at **1–2 (N.C. Ct. App. Jan. 15, 2019); In Re R.W.S., 728 N.W.2d 326, 332–36 (N.D. 
2007); Reaves v. State, 649 P.2d 777, 779-80 (Ok. Ct. Crim. App. 1982); Commonwealth v. 
Johnson, 139 A.3d 1257, 1278 (Pa. 2016); State v. Austin, 731 A.2d 678, 681–83 (R.I. 1999); 
State v. Stewart, 272 S.E.2d 628, 629–30 (S.C. 1980); State v. Doap Deng Chuol, 849 N.W.2d 
255, 261–62 (S.D. 2014); State v. Ferguson, 741 S.W.2d 125, 126–27 (Tenn. Ct. Crim. App. 
1987); Delk v. State, 855 S.W.2d 700, 706–08 (Tex. Ct. Crim. App. 1993); State v. Porter, 
103 A.3d 916, 923–25 (Vt. 2014); Delong v. Commonwealth, 362 S.E.2d 669, 674 (Va. 1987); 
State v. Sanchez, 288 P.3d 351, 378 (Wash. Ct. App. 2012); State v. Kennedy, 249 S.E.2d 
188, 188–91 (W. Va. 1978); State v. Roberson, 935 N.W.2d 813, 828 (Wis. 2019); Campbell 
v. State, 589 P.2d 358, 362–65 (Wyo. 1979). 
 134 Cf., e.g., Coleman v. Thompson, 501 U.S. 722, 729 (1991) (“[T]his Court has no power 
to review a state law determination that is sufficient to support the judgment . . . .”); Minnesota 
v. Nat’l Tea Co., 309 U.S. 551, 557 (1940) (“It is fundamental that state courts be left free and 
unfettered by us in interpreting their state constitutions.”). 
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A. THE EFFECTS OF PROPHYLACTIC REFORM 
Determining whether reforms to eyewitness identification procedures 
designed to reduce the risks of suggestion would improve the accuracy of the 
criminal process is no easy matter.  There is little, if any, reason to believe 
that more rigorous identification protocols would improve the accuracy of 
eyewitness identification. 
1. The Costs and Benefits of More Rigorous Identification Protocols 
Critics of eyewitness identification evidence do not claim that it is akin 
to the categories of evidence considered unduly likely to unfairly prejudice a 
jury, such as evidence of an accused’s supposed propensity to violate the 
law.135  No commentator, for example, has argued for a rule that would bar 
all identification evidence as unfairly prejudicial—presumably all agree that 
some forms of identification evidence are sufficiently reliable to warrant 
admission.  Rather, the advocates of more robust judicial gatekeeping take a 
surgical approach, arguing that eyewitness identification evidence should be 
viewed with special caution when particular factors are present that impinge 
on reliability, such as the use of suggestive identification procedures.136 
A meta-analysis of published field and archival studies of lineups 
conducted by police in actual cases found that 40.8% of witnesses identified 
the suspect, 23.7% of witnesses identified an innocent filler, and 35.5% of 
witnesses identified no one.137  Although there is no way to know whether 
the suspects in these lineups were the actual perpetrators, and although most 
studies did not track the manner in which the lineup was administered, the 
high rate of filler identification suggests that police frequently do not utilize 
procedures that minimize the risk of error.  As the author of the meta-analysis 
observed, “The frequency with which witnesses identified fillers in these 
field studies raises the question of whether these eyewitnesses were properly 
instructed with the warning that the actual culprit might not be in the lineup 
 
 135 See, e.g., Michaelson v. United States, 335 U.S. 469, 475–76 (1948) (“The State may 
not show defendant’s prior trouble with the law, specific criminal acts, or ill name among his 
neighbors . . . . The inquiry is not rejected because character is irrelevant; on the contrary, it 
is said to weigh too much with the jury and to so over-persuade them as to prejudge one with 
a bad general record and deny him a fair opportunity to defend against a particular charge.”) 
(footnotes omitted). 
 136 See supra text accompanying notes 4–6, 47–51. The evidentiary gatekeeping rules that 
have been advocated are canvassed in Part I.B above. 
 137 Wells, supra note 4, at 268–69, 269 tbl.1. 
208 ROSENTHAL [Vol. 110 
and whether they understood that they were free to make no 
identification.”138 
Experiments under laboratory conditions, in which the simulated 
“perpetrator” is known and identification procedures are fully documented, 
can offer some insight into the risk of error created when police fail to 
minimize the risk of suggestion.  In laboratory experiments in which 
witnesses viewed simulated events and then are asked to make 
identifications, there is ample evidence that error rates rise when precautions 
are not taken to prevent suggestion, such as the use of fillers that resemble 
the suspect and blind administration.139 
To be sure, there is reason to doubt the reliability of studies conducted 
under lab conditions.  For example, as we have seen, the stress and fear of 
witnessing a violent crime can inhibit a witness’s memory.140  This is but one 
of a plethora of reasons that virtually all scholars who have addressed the 
matter have concluded that studies conducted under laboratory conditions 
provide limited insight to actual identifications in the field.141 
Indeed, the available data from the field suggest that the costs and 
benefits of more rigorous identification protocols thought to minimize the 
risk of official suggestion are, at best, unclear.  For example, what is perhaps 
the leading study on double-blind administration and non-biased witness 
instructions in actual lineups using both sequential and simultaneous 
identification protocols in four cities, produced the following results: 
 
 
 138 Id. at 269–70. For a discussion of the difficulties in assessing reliability based on the 
rate at which witnesses identify an individual that the police have designated as the suspect, 
see Ruth Horry et al., Archival Analyses of Eyewitness Identification Test Outcomes: What 
Can They Tell Us About Eyewitness Memory?, 38 LAW & HUM. BEHAV. 94, 96 (2014); and 
Daniel B. Wright et al., Field Studies of Eyewitness Memory, in REFORM OF EYEWITNESS 
IDENTIFICATION PROCEDURES, supra note 2, at 179, 195–98. 
 139 See, e.g., Wells, supra note 4, at 265–66 (discussing laboratory research into lineups 
in which only the suspect resembles the description of the perpetrator, and the potential for 
confirming feedback offered by non-blind lineup administrators). 
 140 See supra text accompanying note 49. For helpful discussions of the pertinent research, 
see IDENTIFYING THE CULPRIT, supra note 4, at 94–96; LOFTUS ET AL., supra note 4, at §§ 2–
9; Kerri L. Pickel, Remembering and Identifying Menacing Perpetrators: Exposure to 
Violence and the Weapons Focus Effect, in 2 HANDBOOK OF EYEWITNESS PSYCHOLOGY: 
MEMORY FOR PEOPLE 339, 339–47 (Rod C.L. Lindsay et al. eds., 2007); and Ebbe B. Ebbenson 
& Vladimir J. Konečni, Eyewitness Memory Research: Probative v. Prejudicial Value, 5 
EXPERT EVID. 1, 8–11 (1996). 
 141 For more elaborate discussions of this problem, see Ebbenson & Konečni, supra note 
140, at 4–6; and Wright et al., supra note 138, at 195–98. 










Simultaneous 26.0% 17.8% 56.2% 
Sequential 27.5% 12.3% 60.2% 
Prior Archival 
and Field Studies 
40.8% 23.7% 35.5% 
 
These results reflect a reduction in the rate at which innocent fillers are 
identified when compared to prior field and archival studies in which 
protocols requiring double-blind administration and non-biased witness 
instructions were not employed, but they also reflect even larger reductions 
in the rate at which the suspect is identified, as well as a larger increase in 
the rate at which witnesses make no identification.143  The authors argued 
that the reduced rate of filler identifications suggests that double-blind 
administration reduces the likelihood that an innocent person will be 
mistakenly identified.144  Yet, the rate of filler identifications is a poor proxy 
for establishing the rate at which innocent individuals are convicted; after all, 
innocent fillers are not likely to be prosecuted since there is, presumably, no 
evidence linking them to the crime under investigation.  Perhaps even more 
important, in this study, the rate at which the suspect was identified dropped 
by nearly one-third, and the rate at which no one was identified rose by more 
than one third.  Because we do not know which of the suspects in the lineups 
were actual perpetrators, we cannot know if the reduced rate of 
identifications redounded primarily to the benefit of the innocent or the 
guilty.  Perhaps more rigorous identification protocols reduce the rate of 
 
 142 This study reflects the 494 double-blind photo lineups shown to actual witnesses in 
real cases in four cities (Charlotte-Mecklenburg, North Carolina, Tucson, Arizona, San Diego, 
California, and Austin, Texas). The top three rows of Table 1 are derived from the results 
reported in Gary L. Wells et al., Double-Blind Photo Lineups Using Actual Eyewitnesses: An 
Experimental Test of Sequential Versus Simultaneous Lineup Procedure, 39 LAW & HUM. 
BEHAV. 1, 7–8, 8 figs. 1 & 2 (2015). For the details of the methodology employed in the study, 
see id. at 4–6. The last row reflects the historical rate identified in field studies. See supra text 
accompanying note 138. 
 143 The authors noted the reduced rate at which identifications were made as compared to 
prior field and archival studies, and speculated that prior archival studies might be skewed by 
a failure to document non-identifications in case files, and that the use of double-blind 
administration and express instructions to the witness that the culprit might not be present and 
that the witness need not make an identification might depress the rate at which identifications 
were made. See Wells et al., supra note 142, at 10–11. They also found that the differences in 
the identification rates between sequential and simultaneous procedures were not statistically 
significant. See id. at 7–8. 
 144 Id. at 12. 
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mistaken identifications by making it difficult for witnesses to make any 
identification at all—even accurate identifications.145 
Also notable is another leading, albeit older, field study.  In light of the 
tendency of witnesses to make identifications based on a relative judgment 
about which face in a lineup most resembles their memory of the 
perpetrator,146 some have advocated the use of sequential lineups, in which 
witnesses view faces one at a time, and view all members of a lineup before 
they are asked to make an identification—in recognition of the fact that 
identification is often based on a relative and not an absolute judgment.147  A 
study utilizing double-blind and sequential photographic lineups in real cases 
found that when compared to a then-recent field study used as a baseline, 
double-blind and sequential procedures produced a small increase in the rate 
that suspects were identified, while the rate at which innocent fillers were 
identified declined; but, the rate at which witnesses were unable to make any 
identification also rose: 
 
Table 2148 
Administration Method Suspect ID Filler ID No ID 
Double-blind & Sequential 54% 8% 38% 
Archival Baseline 50% 24% 26% 
 
As Table 2 illustrates, in this study, the use of double-blind and 
sequential identification procedures did not result in a reduction in the rate of 
suspect identifications compared to the archival baseline.  The principal 
result, instead, was a substitution of filler identifications for no-
identifications.  Given that randomly-selected fillers are unlikely to be 
 
 145 Cf. Karen L. Amendola & John T. Wixted, The Role of Site Variance in the American 
Judicature Field Study Comparing Simultaneous and Sequential Lineups, 33 J. QUANTITATIVE 
CRIMINOLOGY 1, 8–12 (2017) (concluding that field study results are attributable to more 
conservative responding by witnesses in sequential procedures); Rakoff & Loftus, supra note 
8, at 94 (“The sequential approach may simply lead to fewer identifications period, reducing 
both accurate and inaccurate identifications. At present, the debate and research designed to 
inform it continue, suggesting that it is not yet established that one approach is superior to the 
other.”). 
 146 See supra text accompanying note 5. 
 147 See, e.g., R.C.L. Lindsay & Gary L. Wells, Improving Eyewitness Identifications from 
Lineups: Simultaneous Versus Sequential Presentation, 70 J. APPLIED PSYCHOL. 556, 562–63 
(1985). 
 148 Table 2 is derived from Amy Klobuchar et al., Improving Eyewitness Identifications: 
Hennepin County Blind Sequential Lineup Pilot Project, 4 CARDOZO PUB. L., POL’Y & ETHICS 
J. 381, 396–98, 398 tbl.2 (2006). For an explication of the methodology of this study, see id. 
at 391–95. 
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prosecuted, converting filler identifications into no-identifications is unlikely 
to reduce the frequency of false convictions.  Procedures that reduce the rate 
at which innocent suspects are identified would protect the innocent, but this 
study does not enable us to determine whether double-blind and sequential 
identifications reduce the rate at which innocent suspects are falsely 
identified as perpetrators. 
Equally notable was that the study found that when witnesses were 
permitted multiple viewings of the photographic lineup, the rate of suspect 
identifications increased.149  Of course, multiple viewings of the lineup 
facilitate relative judgments by the witness, as the authors of the study 
acknowledged.150  Perhaps inhibiting relative judgments means that some 
witnesses are unable to make any identification—even an accurate one. In 
any event, given that the rate at which the suspect was identified did not 
significantly change from the archival baseline, these results offer little 
reason to believe that double-blind and sequential administration is likely to 
reduce the rate of false convictions, which are most likely to result when a 
witness identified the suspects, and quite unlikely when the witness identifies 
an innocent filler.  Perhaps the consistent rate of suspect identification in this 
study suggests that double-blind administration makes little difference to 
false-conviction rates, which, after all, are not driven by the rate at which 
innocent fillers are identified, but instead by the rate at which innocent 
suspects are identified.  Since this study did not alter the rate at which 
suspects are identified, these procedures are unlikely to reduce the rate at 
which innocent suspects are wrongly prosecuted and convicted. 
Next, consider an Illinois field study involving three cities of varying 
populations, which compared identifications made through simultaneous and 
sequential, double-blind procedures.151 
 
 149 In particular, when witnesses in the study were permitted to view lineups multiple 
times, the rate at which the suspect was identified rose, as did the rate at which innocent fillers 
were identified, while the rate at which no identification was made declined, though it 
remained higher than the rate of non-identification in the California field study of 26%: 
 
Laps Lineups (n) Suspect ID Filler ID No Choice 
1 68 66% 3% 31% 
2 42 50% 10% 40% 
3 14 50% 14% 36% 
4, 5 or 6 4 25% 75%  
 
Id. at 399 tbl.3. 
 150 Id. at 398. 
 151 See SHERI H. MECKLENBURG, ILL. ST. POL., REPORT TO THE LEGISLATURE OF THE STATE 
OF ILLINOIS: THE ILLINOIS PILOT PROGRAM ON SEQUENTIAL DOUBLE-BLIND IDENTIFICATION 
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Table 3152 
 Simultaneous Sequential 
n=548 (319) (229) 
ID 59.9% 45% 
Filler ID 2.8% 9.2% 
No ID 37.6% 47.1% 
 
The dramatic reduction in the rate of suspect identifications through 
double-blind, sequential procedures again suggests that witnesses have more 
difficulty making identifications when they are deprived of the ability to 
make relative judgments.  To be sure, the Illinois study has been subject to 
fierce methodological attack.153  Still, the evidence that more rigorous 
identification protocols reduce the rate at which suspects are identified is 
troubling, especially because we cannot know whether the reduced rate of 
suspect identifications disproportionately changed to the benefit of the 
innocent or the guilty. 
Although, as we have seen, studies under laboratory conditions are 
problematic, field studies present problems as well.  The difficulty with field 
studies is that one can never be sure if a witness, by identifying the individual 
that the police regard as the suspect, has in fact identified the actual 
perpetrator.  Laboratory experiments in which researchers know the identity 
of a simulated “perpetrator” do not encounter this problem although, as we 
have seen, there is reason to be skeptical about eyewitness identifications 
under laboratory conditions.154 
 
PROCEDURES 22–37 (Mar. 17, 2006) http://eyewitness.utep.edu/Documents/IllinoisPilotStudy
OnEyewitnessID.pdf [http://perma.cc/CQA7-DNDC]. 
 152 Id. at 37–38, 38 tbl.3a. 
 153 See, e.g., James M. Doyle, Learning from Error in American Criminal Justice, 100 J. 
CRIM. L. & CRIMINOLOGY 109, 141–43 (2010); Daniel L. Schacter, et al., Studying Eyewitness 
Investigations in the Field, 32 LAW & HUM. BEHAV. 3 (2008) (arguing study was flawed by 
using both double-blind and sequential administration as variables and discussing the 
suspiciously low rate of filler identifications in the control group); Nancy K. Steblay, What 
We Know: The Evanston Illinois Field Lineups, 35 LAW & HUM. BEHAV. 1 (2011) (discussing 
evidence that identifications do not reflect random assignment to control and intervention 
groups). For defenses of the study, see Sheri H. Mecklenburg et al., The Illinois Field Study: 
A Significant Contribution to Understanding Real World Eyewitness Identification Issues, 32 
LAW & HUM. BEHAV. 22 (2008); and Stephen J. Ross & Roy S. Malpass, Moving Forward: 
Response to “Studying Eyewitness Identifications in the Field”, 32 LAW & HUM. BEHAV. 16 
(2008). 
 154 See supra notes 142–143 and accompanying text. 
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A meta-analysis of published laboratory studies of various identification 
procedures concluded that the use of lineups, rather than showup 
identifications, reduced rates of false identifications while producing 
somewhat higher rates at which the perpetrator was identified, while all the 
other protocols examined in the literature that are thought to reduce the risk 
of suggestion (unbiased instructions to witnesses, sequential lineups, similar-
looking fillers in lineups, and blind administrators), reduced the rate of both 
false and correct identifications—usually with larger reductions in the rate of 
correct as opposed to false identifications of perpetrators.155  In particular, 







Lineup Instructions (n=23)   
    Biased .59 .15 
    Unbiased .50 .09 
Presentation Format (n=51)    
    Simultaneous .54 .15 
    Sequential .43 .09 
Lineup Filler Similarity (n=18)   
    Lower .67 .31 
    Higher .59 .16 
Administrator Influence (n=11)   
    More .58 .21 
    Less .45 .11 
Showups vs. Lineup (n=15)   
    Showup .41 .18 
    Lineup .43 .11 
 
These results, like the studies canvassed above, suggest that more 
rigorous identification protocols do not simply reduce error rates, but also 
 
 155 See Steven E. Clark, Costs and Benefits of Eyewitness Identification Reform: 
Psychological Science and Public Policy, 7 PERSP. PSYCHOL. SCI. 238, 241–44 (2012). To 
similar effect, see Clark, supra note 7, at 1119–31; Steven E. Clark et al., Legitimacy, 
Procedural Justice, Accuracy, and Eyewitness Identification, 8 U.C. IRVINE L. REV. 41, 67–
77 (2018). 
 156 This table is derived from Clark, supra note 155, at 242 tbl.2. For a discussion of the 
methodology used to identify the studies included in the analysis, see id. at 241, 252–53. 
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make it more difficult for witnesses to make any identification, whether 
accurate or not. 
Thus, a tradeoff between reduced rates of false identifications of 
innocent suspects and increased rates at which witnesses are unable to make 
identifications of guilty perpetrators has been seen both in laboratory and 
field studies.  Perhaps what some label as suggestive identification 
procedures are better characterized as procedures that avoid those 
circumstances that make it unduly difficult for the witness to make an 
identification.  When fillers look much like the suspect, for example, it may 
be too difficult for witnesses to select between them. 
Consider what may be the simplest case for reform—the use of double-
blind administration to eliminate the risk of administrator bias tainting an 
identification.157  Even in that context, we have no idea what the ratio of false 
identifications caused by bias in non-blind administration to the loss of 
accurate identifications is.158  Perhaps blinded procedures create additional 
stress for witnesses that inhibits their ability to make an accurate 
identification; perhaps what some label as suggestion can also be fairly 
characterized as taking care to avoid creating undue stress and difficulty for 
witnesses; and perhaps witnesses are far more resistant to being steered 
toward identifying an innocent suspect than a guilty one.159 
To this, one might respond that if more rigorous protocols reduce 
identification rates, this is only because unreliable identifications are lost.160  
It may also be the case, however, that when identifications protocols become 
extremely rigorous, it becomes unduly difficult for some witnesses to make 
even reliable identifications.  As a committee of the National Research 
Council explained, decisions based on memory rest on “two important 
parameters: the observer’s memory sensitivity and the degree of evidence 
that the observer requires to make an identification.”161  The committee 
elaborated: 
 
 157 For a helpful discussion of the case for blind administration, see Margaret Bull Covera 
& Andrew J. Evelo, The Case for Double-Blind Administration, 23 PSYCHOL. PUB. POL’Y & 
L. 421 (2017). 
 158 Cf. id. at 424 (referring to “the paucity of studies available”). 
 159 Cf. Clark et al., supra note 155, at 73–77 (suggesting that non-blind administrators may 
be more sensitive to witness reactions and accordingly more helpful to witnesses while rarely 
able to steer witnesses toward identifying innocent suspects). 
 160 See, e.g., Risinger, supra note 18, at 343–47 (arguing that identifications obtained by 
non-blind administrators are tainted by unnecessary suggestion and therefore lack probative 
value); Gary L. Wells et al., Eyewitness Identification Reforms: Are Suggestiveness-Induced 
Hits and Guesses True Hits?, 7 PERSP. PSYCHOL. SCI. 264, 265–66 (2012) (arguing that 
identifications produced by suggestive procedures should not be regarded as legitimate). 
 161 IDENTIFYING THE CULPRIT, supra note 4, at 80 (parentheticals omitted). 
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If a witness sets a high bar for acceptable evidence—a conservative bias—then he or 
she will be unlikely to select anyone from the lineup (low pick frequency), meaning 
that they will have more misses (will be more likely to fail to select the suspect because 
they are less likely to make a selection at all) and fewer false alarms. 
Conversely, if a witness sets a low bar for acceptable evidence—a liberal bias—then 
she or he will be more likely to select from the lineup (a high pick frequency), meaning 
that he or she will have more hits and will make more false identifications.162 
Thus, witnesses whose internal threshold for making an identification is 
relatively low would likely produce a higher error rate regardless of the 
identification protocols employed.  We have little idea, however, how to 
identify the witnesses that utilize low internal thresholds for making 
identifications and therefore present an elevated risk of error.  Conversely, 
witnesses who utilize a relatively high internal threshold might find more 
rigorous identification protocols unduly daunting.  Given these complexities, 
outside of pristine laboratory conditions we have no way of knowing at what 
rate accurate and false identifications are lost when more rigorous 
identification protocols are employed. 
Perhaps more important, even an identification based on a witness’s 
relative judgment that a given suspect resembles the witness’s recollection of 
the perpetrator might, coupled with other evidence, amount to reliable proof 
of guilt.163  There is evidence from field studies, for example, indicating that 
identifications produced by simultaneous procedures—despite their greater 
likelihood to be based on relative judgments—were associated with stronger 
independent evidence of the suspect’s guilt than identifications made using 
sequential procedures.164 
Beyond that, if in the real world the perpetrator is likely to be present in 
lineups, then an identification based on a witness’s relative judgment about 
which face most resembled the perpetrator could have considerable probative 
value, especially when combined with independent evidence of guilt.165  In 
 
 162 Id. at 82. 
 163 For an effort to demonstrate, using simulations, that eyewitness identifications based 
on relative judgments may not be materially less accurate than identifications based on 
absolute judgments, see Steven E. Clark et al., Probative Value of Absolute and Relative 
Judgments in Eyewitness Identification, 35 LAW & HUM. BEHAV. 364 (2011). 
 164 See Amendola & Wixted, supra note 145, at 12–18 (analysis of field data from 
Charlotte-Mecklenburg, Tucson, Arizona, San Diego, and Austin suggesting that 
simultaneous identifications occurred in cases with stronger independent evidence of guilt and 
higher likelihood of an adjudication of guilt); John T. Wixted, et al., Estimating the Reliability 
of Eyewitness Identifications from Police Lineups, 113 PROC. NAT’L ACAD. SCI. 304, 308–09 
(2016) (field study in Houston finding stronger independent corroborating evidence of guilty 
for suspects identified through simultaneous rather than sequential procedures). 
 165 Cf. Michael A. Palmer & Neil Brewer, Sequential Lineup Presentation Promotes Less-
Biased Criterion-Setting But Does Not Improve Discriminability, 36 LAW & HUM. BEHAV. 
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other cases, conversely, highly suggestive identification procedures could 
inject an unacceptable risk of error if a prosecution is based on little more 
than a superficial resemblance between a suspect and a perpetrator.166 
Accordingly, assessing the costs and benefits of procedures that 
facilitate identifications, even if they also involve a potential for suggestion, 
most likely requires knowing the frequency at which identifications are made 
when (1) the actual perpetrator is in the lineup, and (2) there is independent 
evidence of guilt that, when combined with the identification, yields a 
reliable case against the suspect.  In the real world, however, we have no idea 
how often that occurs.167 
In sum, the available data suggests that more rigorous identification 
protocols involve some kind of rough tradeoff between reduced rates in 
which innocent suspects are falsely identified and increased rates at which 
witnesses are unable to identify the guilty.  Beyond that, the data are noisy, 
sometimes inconsistent, and provide nothing approaching a clear indication 
that reforms that reduce the risk of suggestion are likely to have a meaningful 
effect on the rate of false identifications—much less benefits that exceed their 
costs.  The data are chaotic, and the state of our knowledge about eyewitness 
identification reform remains primitive.  Perhaps, over more time than is 
reflected in the studies canvassed above, police would learn to administer 
more rigorous identification protocols in a way that would reduce their costs; 
but, at present, there is no reliable evidence to support such speculation.168 
 
247, 253–54 (2012) (“[I]n situations where culprit-present lineups are far more common than 
culprit-absent lineups, accuracy is maximized when responding is lenient, rather than 
unbiased. Conversely, when the base rate of culprit-present lineups is low, accuracy is 
maximized by conservative responding. Because the base rate of culprit-present lineups in 
actual police investigations is not known, we cannot be certain whether less-biased responding 
will produce greater accuracy in these settings.”). 
 166 Cf. Risinger, supra note 18, at 354 (“[A]t least in the case of targets who have been 
selected only because of a claimed resemblance to the perpetrator, the dangers of relative 
judgment are so great that simultaneous presentation ought never to be undertaken.”). 
 167 Cf. id. at 356 (“Unlike the situation where a target is chosen to be put in a lineup merely 
on the basis of some judgment of physical resemblance to the perpetrator, the normal lineup 
situation involves putting the target into the lineup for other reasons bearing on a likelihood 
of guilt greater than a random draw from a large population, such as a tip, etc.  How often does 
such independent evidence result in the true perpetrator being in the lineup, and how often 
not? The answer is, we really don’t know. There simply is no good empirical evidence on the 
issue.”) (footnotes omitted). 
 168 In this connection, it is worth noting that even after police have had decades to adjust 
to the rule requiring that they advise individuals of their rights during custodial interrogation 
announced in Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436 (1966), there is evidence that Miranda 
continues to reduce confession and clearance rates in criminal investigations. See Paul G. 
Cassell & Richard Fowles, Still Handcuffing the Cops? A Review of Fifty Years of Empirical 
Evidence of Miranda’s Harmful Effects on Law Enforcement, 97 B.U. L. REV. 685 (2017). 
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Perhaps one day we will have carefully controlled studies demonstrating 
the effect of more rigorous identification protocols on the rates of both 
accurate and false identification.  Yet, even if we could be confident about 
the rate at which more rigorous identification protocols screen out false rather 
than accurate identifications, the question remains: “What should the 
exchange rate be for correct identifications lost versus false identifications 
avoided?”169  Even this formulation, however, likely understates the problem.  
Given the difficulties in quantifying the costs of both wrongful acquittals and 
convictions, cost-benefit analysis in this arena presents formidable 
difficulties.170 
2. The Problematic Case for Blackstonian Prophylactic Rules 
If jurors could accurately assess the reliability of an eyewitness 
identification, the use of potentially suggestive procedures would not be a 
problem.  We would be able to avoid the potential loss of accurate 
identifications from rigorous identification protocols by permitting 
potentially suggestive procedures, confident in the jury’s ability to assess the 
risk of error created by those procedures.  As we have seen, however, the 
available research suggests that juries overestimate the reliability of 
eyewitness identifications once admitted in evidence.171 
Although more extensive use of expert testimony and cautionary jury 
instructions might ameliorate this problem, the available research on mock 
juries suggests that providing them with additional information about the 
perils of eyewitness identification has limited effects.172  If jurors’ intuitions 
lead them to place great weight on the testimony of an eyewitness with no 
obvious motive to lie, it is far from clear that a counterintuitive lecture on the 
psychology of eyewitness identification is likely to eliminate the problem.173  
 
 169 Clark, supra note 155, at 248. 
 170 Cf. IDENTIFYING THE CULPRIT, supra note 4, at 77–86, 104, 117–18 (the committee 
concluded that in light of the difficulties in assessing the costs and benefits of sequential 
identification protocols compared to sequential protocols, it could not make a recommendation 
between the two.). 
 171 See supra text accompanying notes 7–8. 
 172 See, e.g., CUTLER & PENROD, supra note 6, at 257–63 (summarizing research); Kahn-
Fogel, supra note 14, at 119–20 (same); Rakoff & Loftus, supra note 8, at 96–97; see also 
Wells & Quinlivan, supra note 6, at 21 (“Whether jury instructions . . . will have much impact 
on the jury is an open question, but it is likely to serve a deterrent function because prosecutors, 
who are motivated to keep such instructions away from the jury, will likely help bring pressure 
back on their police departments to avoid suggestive procedures in the future.”). 
 173 Cf. Peter J. Cohen, How Shall They Be Known? Daubert v. Merrell Dow 
Pharmaceuticals and Eyewitness Identification, 16 PACE L. REV. 237, 272–73 (1996) (“There 
is no scientific evidence that cautionary jury instructions, given at the end of what might be a 
long and fatiguing trial, and buried in an overall charge by the court, are effective. A powerful 
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And even if jurors heed the instructions, that may create new problems; 
studies of the jury instructions utilized in New Jersey since the Henderson 
decision indicate that the new instructions cause mock jurors to become more 
skeptical of all eyewitness identifications, regardless of the strength of the 
evidence.174 
Because the risk of error in jurors’ assessments of eyewitness 
identification may be ineradicable, a more robust rule of exclusion triggered 
by a failure to observe prophylactic safeguards against potentially suggestive 
identification procedures might seem the only effective way to reduce the 
rate of wrongful convictions attributable to eyewitness identifications.175  
Unlike Manson’s exclusionary rule, such an approach is not premised on a 
finding that a particular identification is unreliable and therefore likely to 
 
eyewitness’ testimony may be so firmly embedded in the jurors’ minds that the court’s 
instructions days or weeks later may be unable to undo potential prejudice.”). 
 174 See Rakoff & Loftus, supra note 8, at 96–97 (concluding that the studies of the New 
Jersey instructions “suggest that such instructions may not adequately serve their intended 
function of enabling jurors to discriminate more accurately between reliable and unreliable 
eyewitness testimony”). 
 175 Likely the best-known instance of what could be regarded as a prophylactic rule of 
constitutional law is the holding in Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436 (1966), rendering 
statements made during custodial interrogation inadmissible absent the provision of specified 
warnings and a valid waiver of the Fifth Amendment right to be free from compelled self-
incrimination and its progeny. The Court and its members have sometimes characterized the 
rules derived from Miranda as prophylactic in character. See, e.g., Maryland v. Shatzer, 559 
U.S. 98, 103–06 (2010); United States v. Patane, 542 U.S. 630, 638–41 (2004) (plurality 
opinion); Chavez v. Martinez, 538 U.S. 760, 770–73 (2003) (opinion of Thomas, J.); Davis v. 
United States, 512 U.S. 452, 457–58 (1994); Oregon v. Elstad, 470 U.S. 298, 306–08 (1985); 
New York v. Quarles, 467 U.S. 649, 654–58 (1984); Michigan v. Tucker, 417 U.S. 433, 438–
46 (1974); cf. Dickerson v. United States, 530 U.S. 428, 442 (2000) (“In Miranda, the Court 
noted that reliance on the traditional totality-of-the-circumstances test raised a risk of 
overlooking an involuntary custodial confession, a risk that the Court found unacceptably 
great when the confession is offered in the case in chief to prove guilt. The Court therefore 
concluded that something more than the totality test was necessary.”) (citations omitted). 
Many commentators have defended Miranda in terms of prophylaxis. See, e.g., Evan H. 
Caminker, Miranda and Some Puzzles of “Prophylactic” Rules, 70 U. CIN. L. REV. 1, 9–20 
(2001); Yale Kamisar, Confessions, Search and Seizure and the Rehnquist Court, 34 TULSA 
L.J. 465, 471–76 (1999); Klein, supra note 73, at 480–88; David A. Strauss, The Ubiquity of 
Prophylactic Rules, 55 U. CHI. L. REV. 190, 190–95, 208–09 (1988); Stephen J. Schulhofer, 
Reconsidering Miranda, 54 U. CHI. L. REV. 435, 447–53 (1987). Others, however, deny the 
legitimacy of Miranda as a prophylactic rule of constitutional law. See, e.g., JOSEPH D. GRANO, 
CONFESSIONS, TRUTH, AND THE LAW 173–98 (1996). Still others doubt that Miranda is 
properly characterized as prophylactic in character, rather than as articulating a judicially 
administrable rule for identifying the presence of compelled self-incrimination within the 
meaning of the Fifth Amendment. See, e.g., Mitchell N. Berman, Constitutional Decision 
Rules, 90 VA. L. REV. 1, 114–36 (2004); Lawrence Rosenthal, Compulsion, 19 U. PA. J. 
CONST. L. 889, 941–53 (2017). 
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produce a false conviction, but instead on reducing what is thought to be an 
elevated risk of error that exists when suggestive procedures are used to 
obtain the identification.  Commentators advocate the use of prophylactic 
rules when the error rate in case-by-case adjudication is high and the benefits 
of prophylaxis are therefore likely to exceed its costs.176 
As we have seen, however, there is reason to believe that requiring the 
use of more rigorous identification protocols to minimize the risk of 
suggestion is likely to increase the rate at which accurate identifications are 
lost, perhaps to an even greater extent than the rate at which false convictions 
are reduced.  Accordingly, a more robust, prophylactic exclusionary rule 
might not decrease the overall error rate, although it could well reallocate 
error by increasing the rate at which witnesses fail to identify the actual 
perpetrator as it decreases the rate of false identifications.  If prophylaxis 
does not reduce the overall error rate in assessing identification evidence, 
however, one could question the justification for a prophylactic rule requiring 
the exclusion of identification evidence because such evidence is thought to 
present an elevated risk of error.  The available empirical evidence canvassed 
in Part II.A.1 above does not permit any confident conclusion that a 
prophylactic rule would reduce the overall error rate in assessing the 
reliability of eyewitness identifications when compared to Manson’s totality-
of-the-circumstances test. 
A Blackstonian response to these uncertainties is that the law—perhaps 
even the Constitution—tells us how to allocate the risk of error.  The 
Supreme Court, for example, justified its holding that due process of law 
requires that the prosecution prove the defendant’s guilt beyond a reasonable 
doubt by reference to the deeply rooted aversion to conviction of the 
innocent.177  And as we know, Blackstone’s ratio argues against the 
admission of evidence likely to produce wrongful convictions because “it is 
better that ten guilty persons escape, than that one innocent suffer.”178  As 
one commentator put it: 
[W]e embrace the value preference expressed by Blackstone’s ratio . . . .  While that 
ratio is not meant to create a rigid mathematical formula—indeed the acceptable ratio 
of wrongful convictions to failures to convict cannot be set with any mathematical 
 
 176 For defenses of prophylactic rules along these lines, see, for example, Caminker, supra 
note 175, at 6–9; Brian K. Landsberg, Safeguarding Constitutional Rights: The Uses and 
Limits of Prophylactic Rules, 66 TENN. L. REV. 925, 949–64 (1999); Kermit Roosevelt III, 
Constitutional Calcification: How the Law Becomes What the Court Does, 91 VA. L. REV. 
1649, 1668–72 (2005); and Strauss, supra note 175, at 195–208. 
 177 See In re Winship, 397 U.S. 358, 361–64 (1970). 
 178 4 BLACKSTONE, supra note 17, at *352. 
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precision—the maxim does at least express a value preference that has been 
incorporated into constitutional doctrine.179 
Blackstone’s ratio is not uncontroversial; it is far from clear that it 
accurately captures the costs and benefits of error in the criminal justice 
system.180  Even among those who favor some type of ratio to protect the 
innocent, there is no agreement on whether the correct ratio is 10-1 or 
something else.181  One commentator, for example, offered a “Reform Ratio” 
that endeavors to acknowledge the costs of failing to convict the guilty:  
Any wrongful conviction that can be corrected or avoided without allowing more than 
one or two perpetrators of similar crimes to escape, ought to be corrected or avoided; 
in addition, system alterations (reforms, if you will) that there is good reason to believe 
will accomplish this ought to be embraced.182   
Given the limited available data on the efficacy of eyewitness 
identification reforms canvassed above, however, it is doubtful that any of 
them satisfy any plausible reform ratio.  In any event, even for those 
sympathetic to the Blackstonian preference from wrongful acquittal over 
wrongful convictions, invoking the Blackstonian ratio to support the case for 
a more robust, prophylatic eyewitness-identification exclusionary rule would 
considerably oversimplify matters. 
A systemic protection for the innocent is already built into the heavy 
burden of proof that the prosecution must shoulder in a criminal case; that 
burden itself reflects a preference for false acquittals over wrongful 
convictions.183  Whether additional protections are required when it comes to 
eyewitness identification evidence is, however, a separate question.  After 
all, neither the burden of proof nor the general acceptance of the desire to 
minimize the rate of false convictions has produced the view that every 
conceivable precaution must be taken to prevent the conviction of the 
 
 179 Keith A. Findley, Toward a New Paradigm of Criminal Justice: How the Innocence 
Movement Merges Crime Control and Due Process, 41 TEX. TECH L. REV. 133, 136 (2008) 
(footnotes omitted). 
 180 For critiques of the Blackstone ratio arguing that it understates the costs of a ratio 
skewed in favor of acquittal, see, for example, Ronald J. Allen & Larry Laudan, Deadly 
Dilemmas, 41 TEX. TECH L. REV. 65 (2008); and Daniel Epps, The Consequences of Error in 
Criminal Justice, 128 HARV. L. REV. 1065 (2015). For a rebuttal, see Marvin Zalman, The 
Anti-Blackstonians, 48 SETON HALL L. REV. 1319 (2018). 
 181 For a survey of the diverse views on this point, see Alexander Volokh, N Guilty Men, 
146 U. PA. L. REV. 173 (1997). 
 182 Risinger, supra note 18, at 360. 
 183 See text accompanying note 19. 
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innocent.184  Nor has it taken the view that evidence may not be introduced 
if there is some risk that it is unreliable.185 
Indeed, we have little idea what the error rate is for most types of 
evidence.  Most evidence is not infallible—in fraud cases, sometimes alleged 
victims mischaracterize what they were told, innocently or intentionally; in 
arson cases, sometimes circumstantial evidence of the defendant’s financial 
distress will not always accurately indicate that the defendant set a fire to 
collect insurance; in rape cases, sometimes alleged victims lie or are 
mistaken.  The fact that a type of evidence of guilt is not infallible is no reason 
for its exclusion.  After all, it is a perilous enterprise to assess in isolation the 
reliability of any evidence.  Many types of evidence are of dubious reliability 
in the abstract, but when combined with the other evidence in the case, might 
produce what a jury could justifiably regard as a compelling case. 
Accordingly, it is difficult to assess the reliability of any type of 
evidence in isolation.  A fraud victim’s testimony that she was swindled by 
a wealthy and respected investment advisor might, standing alone, seem 
unreliable in light of the victim’s financial motive to gain a restitution 
payment; but in the face of compelling corroboration, the very same 
testimony might come to be seen as credible.  The law does not insist that 
each individual piece of evidence offered against a defendant constitute 
reliable proof of guilt; the reliability of any particular item of evidence is, 
instead, appropriately assessed in light of the totality of the proof.186 
 
 184 See, e.g., Patterson v. New York, 432 U.S. 197, 208 (1977) (“While it is clear that our 
society has willingly chosen to bear a substantial burden in order to protect the innocent, it is 
equally clear that the risk it must bear is not without limits . . . . Due process does not require 
that every conceivable step be taken, at whatever cost, to eliminate the possibility of 
convicting an innocent person.”). 
 185 Cf. Larry Laudan, Eyewitness Identifications: One More Lesson on the Costs of 
Excluding Relevant Evidence, 7 PERSP. PSYCHOL. SCI. 272, 272 (2012) (“[T]here is no rule of 
admissibility that will not occasionally lead to the conviction of an innocent defendant. 
Confessions are sometimes false. Should we exclude them? Expert testimony is occasionally 
mistaken. Should it be excluded? . . . . [T]he quest for evidence that infallibly indicates guilt 
(or innocence) is a snark hunt. It is provable in principle that there is no rule of evidence or 
procedure that will not occasionally lead to a false conviction (or a false acquittal). The fact 
that relevant evidence leads to fallible inferences is no argument for the former’s exclusion.”). 
 186 See, e.g., Bourjaily v. United States, 483 U.S. 171, 179–80 (1987) (“[I]ndividual pieces 
of evidence, insufficient in themselves to prove a point, may in cumulation prove it. The sum 
of an evidentiary presentation may well be greater than its constituent parts. Taken together, 
these two propositions demonstrate that a piece of evidence, unreliable in isolation, may 
become quite probative when corroborated by other evidence.”); cf. Victor v. Nebraska, 511 
U.S. 1, 16 (1994) (upholding a jury instruction defining proof beyond “reasonable doubt” as 
“that state of the case which, after the entire comparison and consideration of all the 
evidence, leaves the minds of the jurors in that condition that they cannot say they feel an 
abiding conviction, to a moral certainty, of the truth of the charge.”) (emphasis in original). 
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The likelihood that prophylactic rules that abjure inquiry into the totality 
of the circumstances will result in the exclusion of highly probative evidence, 
even when obtained through potentially suggestive procedures, may well 
explain difficulties courts have had in applying exclusionary rules purporting 
to be more robust than Manson.  Consider Henderson.  Recall that prior to 
Womble’s contested identification of Henderson, Womble identified the 
accomplice of the man he later identified as Henderson—Clark—and Clark 
then identified Henderson as the individual who accompanied him to the 
scene of the crime.187  Subsequently, upon his arrest, Henderson “admitted to 
the police that he had accompanied Clark to the apartment where Harper was 
killed, and heard a gunshot while waiting in the hallway.  But [Henderson] 
denied witnessing or participating in the shooting.”188  Accordingly, there 
was compelling corroboration for Womble’s contested identification of 
Henderson, including Henderson’s own admission. 
As we have seen, it is difficult to explain the ultimate decision to permit 
the use of Womble’s contested identification in Henderson in terms of the 
systems and estimator variables that were supposed to be the basis for 
applying the prophylactic rule fashioned by the New Jersey Supreme 
Court.189  The decision to admit Womble’s identification is far more easily 
explained by the ample corroborative evidence demonstrating that Womble’s 
identification of Henderson was reliable—not only did Clark (the shooter) 
also place Henderson at the apartment, but Henderson admitted he was there.  
It is difficult to conclude, in light of this evidence, that Womble’s 
 
To be sure, in the context of the Sixth Amendment right of an accused “to be confronted with 
the witnesses against him,” U.S. CONST. amend. VI, the Supreme Court has rejected 
consideration of corroborative evidence when assessing the admissibility of statements made 
in the absence of confrontation. See, e.g., Idaho v. Wright, 497 U.S. 805, 823 (1990) (“[T]he 
use of corroborating evidence to support a hearsay statement’s ‘particularized guarantees of 
trustworthiness’ would permit admission of a presumptively unreliable statement by 
bootstrapping on the trustworthiness of other evidence at trial, a result we think at odds with 
the requirement that hearsay evidence admitted under the Confrontation Clause be so 
trustworthy that cross-examination of the declarant would be of marginal utility.”). 
Confrontation Clause jurisprudence, however, presents a quite different problem from the 
admissibility of identification evidence when the witness making the identification is subject 
to cross-examination; as the Court later explained precisely because the Confrontation Clause 
identifies confrontation as a precondition for the admission of evidence: “Where testimonial 
statements are at issue, the only indicium of reliability sufficient to satisfy constitutional 
demands is the one the Constitution actually prescribes: confrontation.” Crawford v. 
Washington, 541 U.S. 36, 68–69 (2004). If the confrontation requirement is satisfied, 
however, the Constitution prescribes no other test for assessing the reliability of evidence 
beyond the inquiry into the totality of the circumstances described above. 
 187 See supra text accompanying notes 87–90. 
 188 State v. Henderson, 27 A.3d 872, 880 (N.J. 2011). 
 189 See supra text accompanying notes 56–62. 
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identification was unreliable or somehow otherwise likely to lead the jury 
into error, even if the identification was obtained through a potentially 
suggestive procedure in which a blind-administration protocol was 
compromised. 
For another example, consider Commonwealth v. Meas.190  Despite 
purporting to require the exclusion of all identifications obtained through 
unnecessarily suggestive procedures,191 in Meas the Massachusetts Supreme 
Judicial Court upheld the use of showup identifications of a suspect visibly 
in police custody.  In this case, the corroboration included evidence that the 
suspect had been stopped in a vehicle matching the description and 
displaying a similar license plate number to that which had been provided to 
the police by witnesses, shortly after and in the vicinity of a shooting; when 
stopped, a loaded gun was found on the vehicle’s floor and a spent shell 
casing was found where the suspect had been seated; the spent casing in the 
vehicle and another found at the scene of the crime were traced to the firearm 
found in the vehicle; and another of the vehicle’s occupants, after pleading 
guilty to being an accomplice after the fact, testified that he witnessed the 
defendant shoot the victim.192  There may have been no good reason that the 
police failed to arrange a lineup rather than using a suggestive showup 
procedure in Meas, but given the strength of the evidence, the identification 
created scant risk of error. 
Similarly, despite its earlier holding purporting to exclude all 
unnecessarily suggestive identifications,193 the New York Court of Appeals 
upheld a showup identification of an individual visibly in police custody after 
he had been apprehended near the scene of a robbery of a dry cleaner, 
corroborated by the independent identification of the manager who had 
chased the robber and caught up with police as they apprehended the suspect, 
and corroborated as well by the defendant’s subsequent confession.194 
In each of these cases, adherence to a prophylactic rule requiring the 
exclusion of any identification obtained through unnecessarily suggestive 
procedures would have been more likely to detract from, rather than enhance, 
the reliability of the fact-finding process.  Once the contested identification 
is considered in light of the other evidence in the case, there is little reason 
to doubt its reliability.  The rigidity of a prophylactic rule that would exclude 
the identification without reference to the other evidence in the case that 
bears on the perpetrator’s identity may instead increase the risk of error. 
 
 190 5 N.E.3d 864 (Mass. 2014). 
 191 See Commonwealth v. Johnson, 650 N.E.2d 1257, 1259–65 (Mass. 1995). 
 192 Meas, 5 N.E.3d at 869–75, 880–81. 
 193 See People v. Adams, 423 N.E.2d 379, 383–84 (N.Y. 1981). 
 194 See People v. Duuvon, 571 N.E.2d 654, 655–56 (N.Y. 1991). 
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In any event, even when prophylactic safeguards are taken, the 
admission of eyewitness identification evidence still creates a risk of 
wrongful conviction; in the studies canvassed above of identification 
protocols designed to reduce the risk of suggestion, none of the protocols was 
able to drive the rate of false identifications to zero or thereabouts.195  Surely 
that does not suggest that all identification evidence must be barred because 
of the risk of false convictions that it induces—at some unknown ratio to the 
increased rate of false acquittals—into the criminal process. 
To be sure, sometimes it is apparent that identification evidence is 
highly unreliable and should be excluded for that reason.  Perhaps Foster is 
such a case; investigators undertook something of a campaign of suggestion 
directed at a witness who had repeatedly failed to identify Foster, and there 
seems to have been little evidence pointing to Foster beyond the contested 
identification.196  Still, in all but the clearest cases—those where there is little, 
if any, evidence of identity beyond a highly suggestive identification—we do 
not know the extent to which the admission of any particular evidence 
increases the likelihood of a wrongful conviction.  In most cases, moreover, 
there is no ready vehicle for assessing the risk of error injected by eyewitness 
identification evidence, or any other type of evidence.  Most evidence is not 
infallible; surely it is rare that the admission of any type of evidence of guilt 
creates no risk of a wrongful conviction.  There is, accordingly, no logical 
stopping point for exclusion of evidence that gives rise to a risk of wrongful 
convictions; this risk inheres in virtually all evidence. 
We could reduce the rate of wrongful convictions to something 
approaching zero if we required the prosecution to use only the most 
unassailable types of evidence, impeccably corroborated—perhaps only 
cases involving videotapes of the offense and an ensuing, independent, and 
concededly voluntary confession—but, even most Blackstonians would 
likely view the resulting reduction in the rate at which the prosecution can 
convict the guilty as unacceptable.  Surely reforms that increase the rate of 
false acquittals are justified only if they produce a sufficiently large reduction 
in the rate of false convictions to justify the resulting tradeoff.197 
 
 195 See supra Part II.A. 
 196 See supra text accompanying notes 35–37. 
 197 Cf. Paul G. Cassell, Overstating America’s Wrongful Conviction Rate? Reassessing 
the Conventional Wisdom About the Prevalence of Wrongful Convictions, 60 ARIZ. L. REV. 
815, 855 (2018) (“[M]ore rigid requirements for a valid eyewitness identification may protect 
some innocent people from being mistakenly identified, but at the cost of preventing some 
guilty people from being properly identified. In assessing the tradeoffs involved in such 
reforms, the size of relative risks does matter.”) (footnote omitted). 
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Indeed, the Blackstone ratio itself implies an awareness of a tradeoff—
it may not be possible to minimize the rate of false convictions without 
unacceptably increasing false acquittals.  Thus, even for Blackstonians, 
simply minimizing the rate of false convictions will not do.  A fully informed 
assessment of a prophylactic rule requires consideration of not only the 
reduction in the rate of false convictions, but the potential reduction of the 
rate at which the guilty are convicted.198  And, given the limited state of our 
knowledge about the ratio between false acquittals and convictions produced 
by pretty much all types of evidence, the best Blackstonians can do is insist 
on the stringent burden of proof in criminal cases.  Assessing the error rate 
in each type of evidence offered by the prosecution to determine whether 
prophylaxis is justified is an impossible task. 
Even a narrower claim that eyewitness identification evidence presents 
particular risks that warrant a particularly stringent rule of exclusion remains 
problematic.  As we have seen, inaccurate eyewitness identifications have 
been identified as a leading cause of false convictions.199  This point, 
however, is not as compelling as it might at first blush seem. 
Although we can calculate the number of times that a defendant 
convicted on the basis of eyewitness identification evidence was later 
exonerated, we do not have reliable data about the number of accurate 
convictions based on eyewitness identifications; as a result, we cannot know 
that the error rate in these cases is unusually high.200  Moreover, exonerations 
tend to cluster in the types of cases where DNA evidence can conclusively 
establish the identity of the perpetrator, such as cases resting on eyewitness 
identification evidence.201  The rate of false convictions may be as high or 
higher in cases resting on accomplice testimony, the uncorroborated 
testimony of a victim, or circumstantial evidence; it is, however, quite 
difficult to ascertain the actual rate of false conviction in these cases.  One 
 
 198 Cf. Manson v. Brathwaite, 432 U.S. 98, 112–13 (1977) (“[T]he per se approach 
[requiring the exclusion of all evidence obtained by unnecessarily suggestive procedures] 
suffers serious drawbacks. Since it denies the trier reliable evidence, it may result, on occasion, 
in the guilty going free. Also, because of its rigidity, the per se approach may make error by 
the trial judge more likely than the totality approach. And in those cases in which the 
admission of identification evidence is error under the per se approach but not under the 
totality approach, cases in which the identification is reliable despite an unnecessarily 
suggestive identification procedure reversal is a Draconian sanction.”) (footnote and citations 
omitted). 
 199 See supra text accompanying note 2. 
 200 See, e.g., Jennifer E. Laurin, Still Convicting the Innocent, 90 TEX. L. REV. 1473, 1489 
(2012) (reviewing GARRETT, supra note 15) (making this point). 
 201 See, e.g., Gross, supra note 2, at 766 (“If, somehow, DNA permitted us to identify 
robbers as effectively as it identifies rapists, we might have over 800 robbery exonerations 
rather than 100.”). 
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survey, for example, made a powerful case that given the fallibility in 
witnesses’ memories for conversations and jurors’ tendency to believe 
confident witnesses, cases resting on the conversational memories of 
witnesses endeavoring to recall statements attributed to the defendant likely 
produce more false convictions than cases resting on eyewitness 
identifications.202 
Given the advent of DNA evidence, false convictions are more readily 
detectable in eyewitness identification cases than many others, but that does 
not mean that we can reliably conclude that eyewitness identification 
evidence represents anything like a unique problem of reliability.  Indeed, 
since the advent of DNA evidence capable of identifying false 
identifications, perhaps the rate of wrongful convictions in such cases is 
likely to be lower in the future than in other cases in which DNA evidence 
has less utility, such as those involving conversational memory.203 
Accordingly, although courts may have a limited ability to identify 
unreliable identifications under Manson’s totality of the circumstances 
approach, it is unclear that there is any prophylactic alternative likely to 
improve matters.  A prophylactic rule requiring the use of rigorous 
identification protocols does not even attempt to identify unreliable 
identifications, but instead identifies what is regarded as a proxy for 
reliability—the procedures used to obtain identifications.  But because a 
prophylactic rule does not examine the other evidence in the case that might 
corroborate an identification, it may produce a higher error rate than Manson.  
Moreover, to justify prophylaxis on the Blackstonian ground that every 
precaution should be undertaken to exclude evidence that gives rise to a risk 
of false conviction is to adopt a rationale with no logical stopping point—
one that could be used to bar most types of evidence. 
 
 202 See Steven B. Duke et al., A Picture’s Worth a Thousand Words: Conversational 
Versus Eyewitness Testimony in Criminal Convictions, 44 AM. CRIM. L. REV. 1, 6–45 (2007). 
There have been a number of efforts to 9estimate an overall rate of false conviction; see, e.g., 
SANGERO, supra note 4, at 8–14 (estimating the rate of false convictions at 5–10%); Allen & 
Laudan, supra note 180, at 68–71 (estimating an overall wrongful conviction rate of 0.84%); 
Cassell, supra note 197, at 846–48 (estimating an overall wrongful conviction rate of 0.016–
0.062%); Gross, supra note 2, at 784–85 (estimating an error rate for death sentences of 4.1% 
and for other violent felonies of “from one to several percent”); D. Michael Risinger, 
Innocents Convicted: An Empirically Justified Factual Wrongful Conviction Rate, 97 J. CRIM. 
L. & CRIMINOLOGY 761, 769–80 (2007) (estimating a wrongful conviction rate of 3.3–5% for 
capital rape-murders during the 1980s); George C. Thomas III, Where Have All the Innocents 
Gone?, 60 ARIZ. L. REV. 865, 872–79 (2018) (estimating a wrongful conviction rate in North 
Carolina of from one-eighth to one-half of one percent). Whatever the merits of these estimates 
and their underlying methodologies, they tell us nothing about the error rate that inheres in 
identification or other particular types of evidence. 
 203 For a helpful discussion along these lines, see Cassell, supra note 197, at 837–38. 
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If neither the social science research, the Constitution, nor our legal 
tradition offers a workable rule for identifying evidence too unreliable to be 
admitted, then the determination whether the benefits of more restrictive 
identification procedures to protect the innocent are worth the costs that those 
procedures may impose in terms of the loss of identifications of the guilty 
seems like a policy and not a legal question.  Indeed, this is a particularly 
difficult policy question given the difficulties not only in quantifying the 
costs and benefits of reform but also in assigning costs and benefits to both 
the conviction of the innocent and the acquittal of the guilty.204 
In the face of the difficulties of assessing these costs and benefits, it 
should be unsurprising that courts have hewed to Manson’s deferential view.  
Politically accountable legislatures seem far better positioned to assess these 
issues—and to be held accountable for their errors.205  By excluding evidence 
that poses only the most extreme risks to the innocent and relying on the 
traditional view that the jury is the appropriate body to assess the probative 
value of evidence, Manson may represent about the best we can do.  Indeed, 
Manson reflects the approach one would expect in the absence of a 
justification for prophylaxis—requiring the defendant to demonstrate the 
unreliability of the identification on a case-by-case basis, under the totality 
of the circumstances. 
The preceding discussion rests on the view that the appropriate 
objective of policy reform would be to reduce the rate at which factually 
innocent defendants are convicted on the basis of inaccurate identification 
evidence.206  As we have seen, it is difficult to justify prophylactic rules 
thought to minimize the risk of wrongful conviction without logically 
 
 204 For helpful discussions of the difficulty in assessing the costs and benefits of 
identification procedures, see IDENTIFYING THE CULPRIT, supra note 4, at 76–91; and Clark, 
supra note 155, at 246–52. 
 205 Cf. Medina v. California, 505 U.S. 437, 445–46 (1992) (“[B]ecause the States have 
considerable expertise in matters of criminal procedure and the criminal process is grounded 
in centuries of common-law tradition, it is appropriate to exercise substantial deference to 
legislative judgments in this area.”). 
 206 Perhaps this claim can even be framed in terms of a constitutional right to be free from 
factually inaccurate convictions. The Supreme Court has yet to squarely recognize such a 
right, although it has been willing to assume that it exists. See, e.g., Dist. Att’y’s Office for 
Third Judicial Dist. v. Osborne, 557 U.S. 52, 71–72 (2009) (“As a fallback, Osborne also 
obliquely relies on an asserted federal constitutional right to be released upon proof of ‘actual 
innocence.’ Whether such a federal right exists is an open question. We have struggled with 
it over the years, in some cases assuming, arguendo, that it exists.”) (footnote omitted). See 
generally Jackson v. Virginia, 443 U.S. 307, 324 (1979) (recognizing a due process right to 
overturn a conviction on appeal “if it is found that upon the record evidence adduced at the 
trial no rational trier of fact could have found proof of guilt beyond a reasonable doubt”). 
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excluding virtually all evidence of guilt.  Perhaps, however, this represents 
the wrong perspective on the problem of eyewitness identification. 
A different Blackstonian argument is premised not on the desirability of 
a prophylactic rule, but rather on the right of all defendants not to have the 
prosecution unfairly manipulate the evidence.  For example, under what is 
perhaps the most Blackstonian aspect of constitutional doctrine, aside from 
the burden of proof itself, the Supreme Court has held that the right to a fair 
trial under the Due Process Clause is violated when the prosecution 
suppresses material exculpatory evidence.207  From this, one could argue that 
when investigators use unnecessarily suggestive procedures, they 
compromise the right to a fair trial by manipulating identification evidence 
through the use of suggestive procedures, thereby effectively depriving the 
defendant of the ability to obtain a potentially exculpatory non-identification 
that is not tainted by suggestion.208 
Accordingly, if officials take steps to increase the likelihood that a 
witness will make a positive identification through official suggestion, one 
could argue that an accused is deprived of his right to a fair trial under the 
Due Process Clause.  On this view, Manson’s rejection of a per se rule of 
exclusion of identifications obtained through unnecessarily suggestive 
procedures was a serious error.  A per se rule of exclusion would not over-
protect the right in a prophylactic sense, because any effort to manipulate the 
evidence is violative of the accused’s rights, regardless of whether a resulting 
identification proves to be factually accurate.  It is to this contention that we 
finally turn. 
 
 207 See, e.g., Strickler v. Greene, 527 U.S. 263, 280–81 (1999) (“In Brady [v. Maryland], 
this Court held ‘that the suppression by the prosecution of evidence favorable to an accused 
upon request violates due process where the evidence is material either to guilt or to 
punishment, irrespective of the good faith or bad faith of the prosecution.’ We have since held 
that the duty to disclose such evidence is applicable even though there has been no request by 
the accused, and that the duty encompasses impeachment evidence as well as exculpatory 
evidence . . . . Moreover, the rule encompasses evidence ‘known only to police investigators 
and not to the prosecutor.’” (quoting Brady v. Maryland, 373 U.S. 83, 87 (1967), and Kyles 
v. Whitley, 514 U.S. 419, 437 (1995))) (citations omitted). 
 208 Cf. Rosenberg, supra note 15, at 292–93 (“Conducting an unnecessarily suggestive 
pretrial identification procedure is analogous to creating one piece of evidence, the 
identification that results from the procedure, and destroying another piece of evidence, the 
identification, or failure of identification, that would have resulted from a correctly conducted 
process. Indeed, an unnecessarily suggestive procedure threatens to compromise all of the 
subsequent identification testimony by the witness . . . . Given the powerful anchoring effects 
of the suggestive procedure on any subsequent identification, as a practical matter a non-
suggestive procedure cannot be conducted after a suggestive one.”) (footnote omitted). 
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B. ASSESSING RELIABILITY IN LIGHT OF THE TOTALITY OF 
CIRCUMSTANCES 
Some of the criticisms of Manson seem unwarranted.  For example, 
some argue that Manson’s listing of the factors that bear on the reliability of 
an identification is inconsistent with research identifying a variety of other 
factors and casting doubt on the importance of some of the listed factors.209  
Yet, on this point, Manson, after observing that “reliability is the linchpin in 
determining the admissibility of identification testimony,” added, “[t]he 
factors to be considered are set out in [Neil v.] Biggers.”210  Neil v. Biggers, 
in turn, stated that the relevant factors “include the opportunity of the witness 
to view the criminal . . . the witness’ degree of attention, the accuracy of his 
prior description . . . the level of certainty demonstrated at the confrontation, 
and the time between the crime and the confrontation.”211 
Accordingly, Manson and Neil embraced an inclusive approach; they 
did not preclude inquiry into any factor with a demonstrable relationship to 
reliability, or evidence casting doubt on reliability.  Indeed, Manson 
repeatedly described the rule it embraced as involving inquiry into “the 
totality of the circumstances.”212  Thus, it should be unsurprising that a 
number of lower courts have concluded that Manson does not forbid inquiry 
into any factors that bear on reliability, even if not expressly listed in the 
Manson opinion,213 nor does it preclude courts from casting a skeptical eye 
on factors listed as relevant in the opinion, but which subsequent research 
suggests are of limited significance.214 
On a related issue, however, there is greater uncertainty as to Manson’s 
meaning—when assessing the reliability of a suggestive identification, does 
Manson permit consideration of independent corroborative evidence, or only 
 
 209 See supra text accompanying notes 45–51. 
 210 Manson v. Brathwaite, 432 U.S. 98, 114 (1977) (citing Neil v. Biggers, 409 U.S. 188, 
199–200 (1972)). 
 211 Neil, 409 U.S. at 199–200 (emphasis supplied). 
 212 Manson, 432 U.S. at 106, 110, 113. 
 213 See, e.g., State v. Kaneaiakala, 450 P.3d 761, 777–78 (Haw. 2019) (without rejecting 
Manson, the court held that lower courts should consider all factors shown to bear on 
reliability); State v. Almaraz, 301 P.3d 242, 251–53 (Idaho 2013) (explaining that courts 
applying Manson should consider all systems and estimator variables identified in Henderson 
when determining whether the use of identification evidence deprives a defendant of due 
process of law). 
 214 See, e.g., State v. Discola, 184 A.3d 1177, 1187–89 (Vt. 2018) (rejecting use of a 
witness’s degree of certainty as a factor in due process challenges to eyewitness identification 
testimony despite its use in Manson in light of subsequent empirical evidence); cf. State v. 
Dickson, 141 A.3d 810, 824 (Conn. 2016) (“[F]irst time in-court identifications, like in-court 
identifications that are tainted by an unduly suggestive out-of-court identification, implicate 
due process protections and must be prescreened by the trial court.”). 
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evidence related to the reliability of the identification itself?  Consideration 
of this issue, we will see, sheds considerable light on the difficulties of 
exclusionary rules for suggestive identifications more robust than Manson. 
1. The Role of Corroborative Evidence 
A per se rule requiring the exclusion of identifications obtained through 
what are regarded as unduly suggestive procedures, of course, would reject 
any inquiry into whether the identification is corroborated by other evidence.  
In Manson, with respect to the role of independent corroborative evidence, 
the Court wrote, “Although it plays no part in our analysis . . . assurance as 
to the reliability of the identification is hardly undermined by the facts that 
[Brathwaite] was arrested in the very apartment where the sale had taken 
place, and that he acknowledged his frequent visits to that apartment.”215  
Thus, in a single sentence, the Court both disclaimed reliance on 
corroborative evidence and suggested that corroboration bears on reliability.  
In contrast, in his separate opinion, Justice Stevens wrote: “[I]t is sometimes 
difficult to put other evidence of guilt entirely to one side . . . . [T]he Court 
carefully avoids this pitfall and correctly relies only on appropriate indicia of 
the reliability of the identification itself.”216  Yet, this seems an 
overstatement; the opinion of the Court, while treating the corroborative 
evidence as unnecessary to the outcome in that case, seemed to acknowledge 
that corroboration bears on reliability.  It is difficult to read Manson as 
containing a square holding that corroborative evidence is irrelevant when 
assessing reliability under the totality-of-the-circumstances test.217 
Indeed, when it comes to the role of corroborative evidence, the lower 
courts have split.  Some have concluded that Manson permits consideration 
of only evidence relating to reliability of the identification itself, with 
corroborative evidence independent of the identification relevant only on the 
question whether the erroneous admission of identification evidence amounts 
to harmless error.218  Others treat independent evidence that corroborates the 
 
 215 Manson, 432 U.S. at 116 (1977) (footnote omitted). 
 216 Id. at 118 (Stevens, J., concurring) (footnote omitted). 
 217 Cf. GARRETT, supra note 15, at 81–85 (discussing contrasting understandings of 
Manson’s application to corroborative evidence). 
 218 See, e.g., United States v. Greene, 704 F.3d 284, 308–10 (4th Cir. 2012); Raheem v. 
Kelly, 257 F.3d 122, 140–41 (2d Cir. 2001); United States v. Rogers, 126 F.3d 655, 659–60 
(5th Cir. 1997); United States v. Emanuele, 51 F.3d 1123, 1128 (3d Cir. 1995); Green v. 
Loggins, 614 F.2d 219, 224–25 (9th Cir. 1980); Long v. United States, 156 A.3d 698, 707–08 
(D.C. 2017); State v. Jones, 128 A.3d 1096, 1107–08 (N.J. 2016); Wise v. Commonwealth, 
367 S.E.2d 197, 201–02 (Va. Ct. App. 1988); Campbell v. State, 589 P.2d 358, 364–65 (Wyo. 
1979). For endorsements of this view, see Rosenberg, supra note 15, at 286–88; and Rudolf 
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reliability of a contested identification as bearing on its admissibility under 
Manson.219 
There are, to be sure, reasons to resist the use of corroborative evidence 
when assessing the reliability of an identification.  For one thing, 
corroborative evidence could distort the reliability inquiry by bootstrapping 
the reliability of an identification to other evidence.220  For another, 
unnecessarily suggestive identification procedures, one could argue, advance 
no legitimate governmental interest, but instead degrade the reliability of the 
criminal process.221  Beyond that, a per se exclusionary rule would 
incentivize investigators to utilize procedures that minimize the risk of 
 
Koch, Note, Process v. Outcome: The Proper Role of Corroborative Evidence in Due Process 
Analysis of Eyewitness Identification Testimony, 88 CORNELL L. REV. 1097, 1123–40 (2003). 
 219 See, e.g., United States v. Constant, 814 F.3d 570, 575–77 (1st Cir. 2016) 
(identification corroborated by defendant’s confession and fit between description of shooter’s 
gun and his weapon); United States v. Rogers, 73 F.3d 774, 778 (8th Cir. 1996) (independent 
witnesses corroborated contested identification); United States ex rel. Kosik v. Napoli, 814 
F.2d 1151, 1156–57, 1161 (7th Cir. 1987) (identification corroborated by independent 
witnesses’ description of vehicle containing suspects); Graham v. Solem, 728 F.2d 1533, 
1546–48 (8th Cir. 1984) (identification corroborated when defendants admitted to being 
together at the time and scene of the crime); McNary v. Sowders, 660 F.2d 703, 708–09 (6th 
Cir. 1981) (identification corroborated by recovery of pistol taken in robbery and thrown from 
vehicle in which defendant was riding); Lindsey v. State, 572 S.W.2d 145, 146 (Ark. 1978) 
(identification corroborated by recovery from defendant of cash in denominations identical to 
what was taken in robbery); People v. Lee, 502 N.E.2d 399, 407–08 (Ill. Ct. App. 1986) 
(identification corroborated by defendant’s confession); St. Clair v. Commonwealth, 140 
S.W.3d 510, 551–52 (Ky. 2004) (identification corroborated by independent testimony, 
forensic and circumstantial evidence); State v. Egana, 792 So. 2d 931, 935–37 (La. Ct. App. 
2001) (identification corroborated by videotape); Commonwealth v. Hicks, 460 N.E.2d 1053, 
1055–60 (Mass. Ct. App. 1984) (identification corroborated by recovery of fruits of robbery 
from defendant shortly after crime), overruled on other grounds by Commonwealth v. 
Johnson, 650 N.E.2d 1257 (Mass. 1995); Johnson v. State, 354 P.3d 667, 676 (Nev. Ct. App. 
2015) (identification corroborated when victim’s cellphone was found in pocket on 
accomplice); State v. Halley, 637 N.E.2d 937, 941 (Ohio Ct. App. 1994) (identification 
corroborated because suspect was only male staying at the apartment where attack occurred 
and was found in clothes described by victim); State v. Brown, 589 S.E.2d 781, 785–87 (S.C. 
Ct. App. 2003) (identification corroborated when defendant was found where witness stated 
he would be) 
 220 See, e.g., Koch, supra note 218, at 1134 (“[I]f courts were to consider evidence of 
general guilt in determining whether an identification is reliable, that evidence would 
essentially be counted twice—first toward general guilt, then again toward admitting the 
identification, which would, in turn, act as further evidence of guilt. This evidence would 
therefore be weighted too heavily, to the point that outcomes could become distorted.”). 
 221 See, e.g., Rosenberg, supra note 15, at 291 (“[A]n unnecessarily suggestive 
identification procedure simply creates unreliable evidence where reliable evidence could 
have been gathered.”) (footnote omitted). 
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suggestion more effectively than a rule that tolerates suggestion as long as 
corroborative evidence is obtained.222 
The arguments against the use of corroborative evidence are perhaps 
best considered by reference to particular facts, rather than in the abstract.  
To that end, consider once more the facts of Henderson.  The extent to which 
Womble’s identification of Henderson was corroborated was striking—not 
only did Clark (the shooter) also place Henderson at the apartment,223 but 
Henderson himself admitted that he was there.224  It is difficult to conclude, 
in light of this evidence, that Womble’s identification was unreliable in the 
sense that it was likely to lead the jury into error. 
Consider as well the question whether Detective Ruiz and Investigator 
MacNair engaged in anything that should be characterized as unnecessarily 
suggestive.  Even if they put some pressure on Womble to make an 
identification, recall that Womble had previously lied to them about his 
knowledge of the shooting, and later admitted that he was afraid to make an 
identification because he had been threatened.225  In high-crime communities, 
the threat of retaliation is often quite real; for example, the pertinent literature 
reflects the prevalence of intimidation tactics by urban street gangs as a 
means of inhibiting community cooperation with the police.226  Indeed, 
researchers have found that “offenders in gang-related and drug-related 
homicides are much less likely to be arrested . . . in part due to lack of witness 
cooperation.”227  In light of this, when a witness who has previously admitted 
to being in proximity to a homicide, and who has expressed a fear of 
retaliation that has already compromised his candor with the authorities, then 
fails to make an identification during an ensuing identification procedure, it 
 
 222 See, e.g., Manson v. Brathwaite, 432 U.S. 98, 125 (1977) (Marshall, J., dissenting) 
(“[T]he Court acknowledges that one of the factors, deterrence of police use of unnecessarily 
suggestive identification procedures, favors the per se rule [requiring exclusion of 
identification obtained by unnecessarily suggestive procedures]. Indeed, it does so heavily, for 
such a rule would make it unquestionably clear to the police they must never use a suggestive 
procedure when a fairer alternative is available.”). 
 223 At trial, the court admitted Clark’s videotaped statement which, while placing 
Henderson in the apartment at the time of the shooting, largely exculpated him. Id. at 882 & 
n.2. 
 224 Id. at 880, 882. 
 225 See supra text accompanying notes 87–89. 
 226 See, e.g., AL VALDEZ, UNDERSTANDING STREET GANGS 19–20 (3rd ed. 1997); Bruce 
D. Johnson et al., Drug Abuse in the Inner City: Impact on Hard-Drug Users and the 
Community, in CRIME AND JUSTICE.: A REVIEW OF RESEARCH 9, 35–37 (Michael Tonry & 
James Q. Wilson eds., 1990). 
 227 Anthony A. Braga & Rod K. Brunson, The Police and Public Discourse on “Black-
On-Black” Violence, in NEW PERSPECTIVES ON POLICING 2015, at 6 (Nat’l Inst. Of Just., Pub. 
No. 248588, May 2015). 
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is far from clear that it is inappropriate for investigators to confront the 
witness rather than simply giving up, especially when a jury will 
subsequently be able to assess all of the circumstances surrounding the 
identification, including the witness’s initial reluctance. 
The facts of Henderson suggest two important, if interrelated, 
difficulties with a per se rule requiring suppression of all identification 
evidence that results from unnecessarily suggestive procedures. 
First, it will not always be obvious what should be characterized as 
unnecessary suggestion or an improper effort to tamper with identification 
evidence.  In a great many cases, it will not be difficult for the defense to 
identify some additional precaution that could have been taken to avoid 
suggestion.  Thus, defense counsel will likely be able to characterize many 
identifications as unnecessarily suggestive.  Yet, determining whether some 
additional precaution was appropriate will often be challenging.  Even 
though Detective Ruiz and Investigator MacNair compromised the double-
blind protocol, it could well have been necessary for them to confront 
Womble to overcome his fear of retaliation.  We cannot be confident whether 
the actions taken by the officers were necessary or not.  Perhaps Womble was 
genuinely uncertain of his identification and yielded to police pressure; or 
perhaps Womble was unwilling to become the chief prosecution witness in a 
murder case in the face of a threat of retaliation.  We cannot know for sure.  
The data set out above, however, suggests that more rigorous identification 
protocols will sometimes result in the loss of accurate identifications.  
Perhaps procedures that some might characterize as unnecessarily 
suggestive, others could justifiably believe are necessary to obtain probative 
evidence. 
A rule requiring exclusion of unnecessarily suggestive identifications 
could be thought justifiable to the extent that it deters official misconduct.228  
It will frequently be difficult, however, to determine if an officer’s response 
to a witness’s failure to make an identification represents misconduct or a 
necessary prod to a reluctant or fearful witness.  If a finding of unnecessary 
suggestion resulted in a rule of automatic exclusion, quite high stakes would 
be placed on the resolution of what, in the real world, is the difficult question 
of whether any particular tactic was necessary to obtain useful information 
from fearful witnesses. 
 
 228 Cf. Katherine R. Kruse, Wrongful Convictions and Upstream Reform in the Criminal 
Justice System, 3 TEX. A&M L. REV. 367, 382 (2015) (“As upstream reforms to eyewitness 
identification procedures gain momentum, the failure of law enforcement agencies to adopt, 
enforce, or follow them—especially in the face of statutory mandates—could be seen as a 
form of deliberate misconduct warranting a deterrent sanction.”). 
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The point can be made in doctrinal terms.  While the suppression of 
material exculpatory evidence violates the Due Process Clause, the use of 
what are regarded as suggestive identification procedures presents a different 
problem.  Because we cannot know whether the witness would have made an 
identification had different identification protocols been used, the use of 
suggestive identification procedures deprives the accused of only potentially 
exculpatory evidence—we cannot know for sure, because the inquiry is 
counterfactual.  The Supreme Court has held that when officials destroy or 
otherwise make unavailable potentially exculpatory evidence, due process is 
violated only if officials have acted in bad faith.229  This is, accordingly, the 
doctrinal framework applicable to a failure to utilize more rigorous 
identification protocols.  As we have seen, however, more rigorous 
identification protocols that minimize the risk of suggestion may also make 
it harder to obtain accurate identifications.230  A failure to utilize prophylactic 
procedures may reflect bad faith, but it also could reflect an effort to avoid 
the unnecessary loss of important evidence. 
In Henderson, for example, it is far from clear that Detective Ruiz and 
Investigator MacNair acted in bad faith, even if they undermined the 
prescribed double-blind identification protocol.  Perhaps they had accurately 
perceived Womble’s reluctance to become a prosecution witness in a 
homicide case and compromised the double-blind protocol only for that 
reason.  To be sure, if courts announced a per se rule requiring exclusion of 
any identification obtained after blind administration had been compromised, 
then the detectives’ conduct could be characterized as a bad-faith violation 
of a known legal duty, but one cannot justify such a rule merely by assuming 
that officers act in bad faith when they compromise blind administration in 
the absence of a per se rule demanding blind administration.  Sometimes, 
officers may conclude that blind administration has impeded their ability to 
confront a recalcitrant witness who balks at making an accurate 
identification.  If so, perhaps a decision to confront a potentially recalcitrant 
witness may have a fully sufficient law enforcement justification. 
Second, and relatedly, Henderson also demonstrates that sometimes 
there will be little reason to doubt the accuracy of an identification even in 
the face of official suggestion.  After all, Womble’s identification was 
corroborated by both Clark and Henderson himself.  Even if an identification 
made under suggestive circumstances might then induce police to seek 
corroborative evidence, this does not inevitably mean that the resulting 
corroboration is unreliable.  There is no indication in Henderson, for 
 
 229 See Arizona v. Youngblood, 488 U.S. 51, 57–58 (1988). 
 230 See supra Part II.A.1. 
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example, that Clark’s identification of Henderson, or Henderson’s admission 
that he was present at the scene of the shooting, represents mere 
bootstrapping onto a suspect identification.231  Even if a potentially 
suggestive identification causes the police to seek corroborative evidence, 
the resulting corroboration may well demonstrate the accuracy of the 
identification.  The existence of corroborative evidence does not negate the 
fact that a suggestive identification procedure was used, but it can 
demonstrate that whatever the suggestion, it poses little risk of convicting an 
innocent suspect. 
The point is not unique to Henderson.  In Stovall v. Denno, for example, 
although Stovall was identified by the victim when he was brought to her 
hospital room in police custody under highly suggestive circumstances, 
police found a shirt at the scene of the attack containing keys that they traced 
to Stovall.232  In Perry v. New Hampshire, Perry’s contested identification as 
the individual who had been trying to break into parked cars occurred after 
he had been taken into police custody by an officer who found Perry standing 
between parked cars and holding two car amplifiers with a metal bat lying on 
the ground behind him, and then learned that the rear window of a nearby car 
was shattered and its speakers and amplifiers were missing.233  In 
Commonwealth v. Hicks, although the victim made an identification only 
when police told him that they had apprehended the men who had robbed 
him, the suspects had been found near the scene of the crime and shortly after 
it occurred, in possession of the items taken in the robbery.234  In each of 
these cases, the identification procedures were suggestive, but there was also 
little doubt that the identifications were accurate.  Indeed, we have seen 
numerous cases in which corroborative evidence convincingly demonstrated 
the reliability of an identification obtained through what were likely 
unnecessarily suggestive procedures.235  Whatever manipulation may have 
occurred in the identification process, its outcome in these cases was reliable.  
While there may be some cases in which an identification is mistaken despite 
corroboration, there are surely many others in which corroborative evidence 
will greatly reduce the likelihood that an identification was erroneous. 
As it happens, one of the reforms that some critics have advocated to 
protect the innocent is a requirement that convictions that rest on eyewitness 
 
 231 See supra text accompanying notes 87–90, 183–184. 
 232 See Stovall v. Denno, 388 U.S. 293, 295 (1967). 
 233 Perry v. New Hampshire, 565 U.S. 228, 233–34 (2012). 
 234 Commonwealth v. Hicks, 460 N.E.2d 1053, 1054–55 (Mass. Ct. App. 1984), overruled 
on other grounds by Commonwealth v. Johnson, 650 N.E.2d 1257 (Mass. 1995). 
 235 See supra text accompanying notes 183–190. 
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identification testimony not be sustained absent corroboration.236  This 
position is based on the insight that corroboration is one way in which 
evidence can be shown to be reliable.  Indeed, many types of evidence—the 
testimony of an accomplice offered leniency, or a jailhouse informant, or a 
confession exacted in the face of aggressive interrogation techniques—might 
be regarded as unreliable in the abstract, but once corroborated, can constitute 
powerful—and reliable—evidence of guilt. 
2. Corroborated Identifications and the Right to a Fair Trial 
As we have seen, it is difficult to assess the reliability of any piece of 
evidence in the abstract; it is frequently only when the totality of the evidence 
is assessed that it becomes possible to reach judgments about reliability.237  
It is not obvious why a defendant is denied a fair trial when convicted on the 
basis of evidence that proves reliable in light of the available corroboration. 
Even if corroborative evidence is used twice during a prosecution—
once to convince the judge of the admissibility of an identification under 
Manson, and again to convince the trier of fact of the defendant’s guilt—that 
does not mean that the resulting conviction is not supported by appropriate 
proof.  Corroborative evidence is often doubly considered in this fashion—
for example, proffered hearsay is considered, together with corroborative 
evidence, both to determine its admissibility, and, subsequently, as 
substantive proof of guilt at trial.238  Nor does the use of evidence in this 
fashion involve a logical bootstrap.  If the reliability of evidence is to be 
considered both when it is admitted and again when determining whether the 
defendant’s guilt has been proven, then corroborative evidence bearing on 
reliability is logically relevant at both stages. 
 
 236 See, e.g., Kruse, supra note 228, at 388–92; Boaz Sangero & Mordechai Halpert, Why 
A Conviction Should Not Be Based on a Single Piece of Evidence: A Proposal for Reform, 48 
JURIMETRICS J. 43, 90–94 (2007); Sandra Guerra Thompson, Beyond a Reasonable Doubt? 
Reconsidering Uncorroborated Eyewitness Identification Testimony, 41 U.C. DAVIS L. REV. 
1487, 1523–43 (2008); cf. Wells & Quinlivan, supra note 6, at 20 (arguing that when 
suggestive procedures are used the burden should be placed on the prosecution to demonstrate 
reliability by evidence independent of the identification). There are, however, a great many 
difficulties in fashioning and administering a standard for corroboration. For an illustrative 
discussion, see David Crump, Eyewitness Corroboration Requirements As Protection Against 
Wrongful Conviction: The Hidden Questions, 7 OHIO ST. J. CRIM. L. 361 (2009). 
 237 See supra text accompanying note 182. 
 238 See, e.g., Bourjaily v. United States, 483 U.S. 171, 179–81 (1987) (explaining that 
although hearsay is presumed unreliable, an alleged coconspirator’s hearsay statements may 
be considered together with other evidence to determine both admissibility as the statement of 
a conspirator and as proof of guilt at trial). 
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To be sure, the courts that ignore independent corroborative evidence 
when assessing the admissibility of an identification still consider such 
evidence on the question whether the improper admission of identification 
evidence was harmless error.239  Perhaps, in the examples canvassed above, 
the identifications should have been excluded, yet the convictions could have 
been upheld on the ground that the error in admitting the identifications was 
harmless in light of the corroborative evidence. 
Nevertheless, even if erroneously admitted identification evidence is 
sometimes harmless error, an exclusionary rule more robust than Manson, or 
one that required the use of demanding identification protocols that reduce 
the rate at which even accurate identifications are made, could still have 
dramatic effects, even in cases with powerful corroborative evidence.  After 
all, just as “the in-court testimony of an eyewitness can be devastatingly 
persuasive,”240 an eyewitness’s inability to provide such testimony might be 
of great significance as well, even in light of corroborative evidence.  If the 
key witness is not able to identify the defendant, skillful defense counsel 
could persuasively argue that the lack of an identification by the key 
eyewitness suggests reasonable doubt, despite the remaining evidence.  
Indeed, some jurors may draw an adverse inference from a key witness’s 
failure to identify the defendant—affording it perhaps greater weight than is 
warranted.241  Under a regime in which trial courts exclude all suggestive 
identifications, conviction rates may well decline if jurors are troubled by the 
failure of the prosecution to adduce identification testimony from key 
witnesses. 
 
 239 See supra text accompanying note 214. The use of unconstitutionally obtained 
identification evidence is considered harmless if it is shown beyond reasonable doubt that the 
improper evidence had no effect on the verdict. See, e.g., Moore v. Illinois, 434 U.S. 220, 232 
(1977) (citing Chapman v. California, 386 U.S. 18 (1967)). 
 240 United States v. Greene, 591 F.2d 471, 475 (8th Cir. 1979). 
 241 This problem arises both in cases in which witnesses are unable to make accurate 
identifications because of the use of more rigorous protocols, and in cases in which jurors are 
unaware that the witness actually made an identification because it was excluded from 
evidence prior to trial. In the latter cases, the problem is exacerbated because when an 
identification is excluded, all subsequent identifications must also be excluded unless based 
on an independent source, which is a difficult showing to make; see, e.g., Thompson, supra 
note 15, at 627 (“Based on scientific studies about memory distortion, a strong argument can 
be made that an earlier suggestive identification procedure will permanently distort any 
later identification by the same witness, including an in-court identification. Thus, 
a suggestive pretrial identification procedure renders any in-court identification just as 
unreliable as the pretrial identification.”) (footnote omitted). For this reason, a per se rule 
excluding all unnecessarily suggestive identifications is likely to taint any subsequent effort 
to obtain an identification from the witness. 
238 ROSENTHAL [Vol. 110 
Most important, however, is the question whether the use of a 
corroborated identification should be regarded as constitutional error in the 
first place.  As we have seen, in terms of existing doctrine, governmental 
conduct that deprives a defendant of potentially exculpatory evidence 
violates due process only if undertaken in bad faith, and it is difficult to 
characterize the government’s refusal to utilize identification protocols that 
make it more difficult for witnesses to make even accurate identifications as 
reflecting bad faith.242  Even putting this point aside, it is difficult to 
understand why the use of a reliable identification—whether because it has 
been corroborated or for any other reason—somehow deprives a defendant 
of a fair trial. 
For example, when the fillers in a lineup do not closely resemble the 
perpetrator, it may be difficult for a court or a jury to tell whether a resulting 
identification is tainted by suggestion.  Even an identification based on a 
relative judgment that the suspect resembles the perpetrator, however, can 
represent probative evidence of guilt.243  Moreover, when a witness’s relative 
judgment about the similarity between the perpetrator and a suspect is 
corroborated in a meaningful way, it is hard to deny that even a relative 
judgment represents appropriate evidence of guilt, just as eyewitnesses who 
never see a perpetrator’s face can be permitted to describe his height, or hair 
color.  Again, there may be some cases in which even corroborated 
identifications prove mistaken, but surely substantial corroboration greatly 
reduces the risk of error.  For this reason, it becomes difficult to conclude 
that the prosecution has deprived the defendant of exculpatory evidence 
merely because more rigorous identification protocols were not employed.  
The defense is free to argue that had different identification procedures been 
used, the result might have been exculpatory, but in light of the available 
corroboration, the trier of fact is surely entitled to credit the identification 
despite the use of potentially suggestive procedures.  At a minimum, 
 
 242 See supra text accompanying notes 224–226. 
 243 Cf. Clark et al., supra note 155, at 66–67: 
[T]he absolute-relative distinction is imprecise and may fail at both ends. At one end, a pure 
relative model makes a clearly false prediction: if a witness to an armed robbery (by any white 
male) were presented with a lineup consisting of George W. Bush and five penguins, he or she 
would identify the 43rd President with a high level of confidence. One may reasonably condemn 
as illegitimate all identifications based on such a pure relative judgment decision rule, but this 
might only provide guidance to condemn a decision strategy that almost no witnesses ever use. At 
the other end, a pure version of the absolute judgment strategy, with no relative component, may 
also fail as a psychological theory. With few extremely rare exceptions (i.e., perfect pitch), 
almost all human judgments involve relative judgments to some degree. Thus, it would not make 
sense to declare an identification to be illegitimate simply because it was based in part on relative 
judgments, as such a standard would render all eyewitness identifications to be illegitimate. 
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whatever the value of speculation that had more rigorous identification 
protocols been used, the defendant would not have been identified, 
counterfactual speculation of this character is far different from the 
prosecution’s failure to disclose actual exculpatory information of which it is 
aware. 
Of course, there is an argument for evidentiary rules that deter the use 
of unnecessarily suggestive identification procedures.  A constitutional 
argument for deterrence, however, must be anchored in the accused’s right 
to a fair trial, and not merely in an interest in punishing officials for their 
failure to utilize what might be regarded as best practices for identification.244  
After all, as we have seen in Part II.A.2 above, the purely prophylactic case 
for more rigorous identification protocols is a problematic one.  Yet, 
establishing that a failure to utilize practices that minimize the risk of 
suggestion deprives an accused of the right to a fair trial is problematic. 
As we have seen, assessing what constitutes unnecessary suggestion is 
a complicated business; the use of less rigorous identification protocols may 
be necessary to avoid the loss of even accurate identifications when more 
rigorous protocols make identifications more difficult to make.245  Exclusion 
may deter misconduct, but it might also, in a case like Henderson, deter the 
police from doing what is necessary to convince a fearful witness to identify 
a violent offender.  In any event, if corroborative evidence demonstrates that, 
despite the suggestiveness of the procedures employed, the identification is 
reliable, then the likelihood that suggestive identification procedures 
deprived the defendant of exculpatory evidence or otherwise facilitated the 
conviction of an innocent person is surely low. 
A defendant convicted on the basis of reliable identification evidence—
because it has been corroborated—will accordingly have difficulty 
demonstrating that he was unfairly deprived of exculpatory evidence by the 
use of potentially suggestive identification procedures.  Instead, when the 
corroborative evidence is sufficiently powerful, it is far more likely that the 
use of more rigorous identification protocols would have made no difference, 
or, at most, would have prevented the prosecution from obtaining a reliable 
identification of a guilty perpetrator because, as we have seen in Part II.A.1 
above, more rigorous identification protocols reduce the rate at which even 
accurate identifications are made.246 
 
 244 Cf., e.g., Brady v. Maryland, 373 U.S. 83, 87 (1963) (“The principle . . . is not 
punishment of society for misdeeds of a prosecutor but avoidance of an unfair trial to the 
accused.”). 
 245 See supra Part II.A.1. 
 246 For this reason, anchoring a constitutional argument against the use of evidence 
obtained through unnecessarily suggestive procedures, but also corroborated by independent 
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3. The Difficulty of Abandoning Manson 
The argument advanced above not only supports the use of 
corroborative evidence in applying Manson, but also demonstrates the 
difficulties of any Blackstonian approach to the admissibility of eyewitness 
identification evidence. 
Once one departs from a test of reliability under the totality of 
circumstances, one necessarily enters the realm of prophylaxis.  After all, a 
totality-of-the-circumstances test demands that a judge make the best 
assessment possible about the reliability of an identification in light of all 
available information.  It is perhaps for this reason that even the states that 
purport to employ robust exclusionary rules seem to balk at hewing to those 
rules, as we have seen.247 
The prosecution’s burden of proof beyond a reasonable doubt already 
builds into the criminal process significant protection against convicting the 
innocent.  We proceed further at our peril.  As we have seen, there is no 
reliable way to gauge the costs and benefits of a prophylactic rule that would 
exclude evidence judges find to be reliable, even if produced by 
unnecessarily suggestive identification procedures.  Indeed, we have also 
seen that it is even difficult to decide what is unnecessarily suggestive, given 
that more rigorous identification protocols seem not only to reduce the risk 
of false identifications, but also the rate at which guilty perpetrators are 
 
evidence, in the government’s obligation not to suppress exculpatory evidence faces an 
additional doctrinal obstacle beyond the defendant’s likely inability to establish bad faith. The 
suppression of even actual (not merely potentially) exculpatory evidence does not deprive a 
defendant of the constitutional right to a fair trial unless there is a reasonable probability that 
the suppressed evidence would have produced a different verdict. See, e.g., Strickler v. 
Greene, 527 U.S. 263, 289–90 (1999) (To obtain relief, a defendant “must convince us that 
‘there is a reasonable probability’ that the result of the trial would have been different if the 
suppressed documents had been disclosed to the defense. As we stressed in Kyles: ‘[T]he 
adjective is important. The question is not whether the defendant would more likely than not 
have received a different verdict with the evidence, but whether in its absence he received a 
fair trial, understood as a trial resulting in a verdict worthy of confidence.’” (citation omitted 
and brackets in original) (quoting Kyles v. Whitley, 514 U.S. 419, 434 (1995)). When there is 
adequate corroboration for an identification, it will be difficult for an accused to establish a 
reasonable likelihood that the use of an alternative identification procedure would have 
exculpated her. 
 247 See supra Part I.C; cf. Manson, 432 U.S. 98, 112–13 (“[T]he per se approach suffers 
serious drawbacks. Since it denies the trier reliable evidence, it may result, on occasion, in the 
guilty going free. Also, because of its rigidity, the per se approach may make error by the trial 
judge more likely than the totality approach. And in those cases in which the admission of 
identification evidence is error under the per se approach but not under the totality approach 
—cases in which the identification is reliable despite an unnecessarily suggestive 
identification procedure—reversal is a Draconian sanction.”) (footnote omitted). 
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correctly identified.248  Perhaps it is necessary to run some risk of false 
identification of the innocent to achieve an acceptable rate at which the guilty 
can be identified. 
Nor is it easy to explain why due process prevents a conviction obtained 
by evidence that a judge finds reliable under the totality of the circumstances, 
even if it is possible that more rigorous identification protocols might not 
have generated the same evidence.  After all, it is hard to know whether the 
different result that a more rigorous protocol might produce would reflect a 
false identification of an innocent, or a false exoneration of the guilty.  In any 
event, any effort to assess reliability exclusively by reference to the 
procedures used to obtain an identification is a fool’s errand.  As we have 
seen, the reliability of most evidence cannot be assessed in a vacuum; 
reliability can be properly assessed only in light of the totality of the 
circumstances.249  That is what makes Manson preferable to its prophylactic 
alternatives.  A Blackstonian approach that resists any evidence thought to 
raise a risk of wrongful conviction, as we have seen, is one that could bar the 
use of pretty much any evidence of guilt.  Without a stopping point, 
unvarnished Blackstonism becomes an engine for the destruction of the 
criminal justice system. 
CONCLUSION 
It is strong medicine for a court to bar an eyewitness—perhaps even a 
victim—from testifying that she sees the perpetrator sitting in the 
courtroom.250  For that reason, it may be that Manson will inevitably be 
applied in a deferential manner; in all but the clearest cases, most judges are 
likely to balk at the idea of preventing an eyewitness from telling a jury what 
she saw.  Perhaps expert testimony and jury instructions can sensitize juries 
to the risks of eyewitness identification evidence, although, as we have seen, 
there is reason to doubt that this will prove anything close to a panacea.251  
Even so, there is no good alternative. 
Blackstonians could drive the risk of wrongful conviction on the basis 
of eyewitness testimony to zero by barring all of it; but few would regard that 
as an acceptable tradeoff.  Surely Manson was correct to observe that our 
 
 248 See supra Part II.A.1. 
 249 See supra text accompanying note 182. 
 250 Cf. Richard A. Rosen, Reflections on Innocence, 2006 WIS. L. REV. 237, 251 
(“[I]magine looking a rape victim in the eye, one who swears that she can identify the man 
who violated her, and telling that woman she will not even be allowed to tell her story to a 
jury. It is no wonder that few identifications have been suppressed for due process 
violations.”) (footnote omitted). 
 251 See supra text accompanying notes 168–170. 
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conception of due process includes concern about preserving the ability of 
the prosecution to have a fair opportunity to convict the guilty.252  Absent far 
clearer empirical evidence about the costs and benefits of prophylaxis than 
can be found in current research, Manson’s totality-of-the-evidence 
approach, with all its imperfections, is likely the best we can do. 
As long as fallible people are involved in the administration of justice, 
there will be a risk of wrongful conviction.  To be sure, there are ample 
reasons to endeavor to minimize the risk of wrongful conviction.  It is no 
small feat, however, to design Blackstonian reforms that drive down the risk 
of wrongful conviction of the innocent without increasing the rate at which 
the guilty go free. 
If the guilty must go unpunished to vindicate a constitutional limitation 
on the ability of the government to obtain evidence—such as the Fourth 
Amendment’s prohibition on unreasonable search and seizure—then perhaps 
that is a price that the Constitution itself exacts.253  No such constitutional 
limitation is at stake, however, when the objection to evidence obtained by 
the government is that it may be unreliable.  If reliability is the constitutional 
concern, then a totality-of-the-circumstances test for reliability seems well-
suited to address the problem.  It is far from evident that a prophylactic 
approach would be superior.  A totality-of-the-circumstances test will 
produce an error rate—especially given the reluctance of courts to exclude 
eyewitness accounts—but prophylaxis, by its nature, produces an error rate 
as well. 
Perhaps Manson is doomed to be applied in a manner that renders it 
largely toothless except in the face of the clearest examples of official 
suggestion, but that may well be the best that we can expect when the 
judiciary must grapple with the difficult tradeoff between the risk of 
convicting the innocent if eyewitness testimony is wrong, and acquitting the 
guilty if the eyewitness testimony kept from the trier of fact.  Perhaps due 
 
 252 See Manson, 432 U.S. at 111–13 (“There are, of course, several interests to be 
considered and taken into account,” including “the effect on the administration of justice,” and 
adding that “inflexible rules of exclusion that may frustrate rather than promote justice have 
not been viewed recently by this Court with unlimited enthusiasm.”). 
 253 Cf. Potter Stewart, The Road to Mapp v. Ohio and Beyond: The Origins, Development 
and Future of the Exclusionary Rule in Search-and-Seizure Cases, 83 COLUM. L. REV. 1365, 
1392–93 (1983) (“Much of the criticism leveled at the exclusionary rule is misdirected; it is 
more properly directed at the fourth amendment itself. It is true that, as many observers have 
charged, the effect of the rule is to deprive the courts of extremely relevant, often direct 
evidence of the guilt of the defendant. But these same critics sometimes fail to acknowledge 
that, in many instances, the same extremely relevant evidence would not have been obtained 
had the police officer complied with the commands of the fourth amendment in the first 
place.”) (footnotes omitted). 
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process must accommodate the reality that achieving an optimal balance 
between those two risks is a hopeless task.  The jury may be an imperfect 
vehicle for assessing eyewitness evidence, but it is the vehicle for resolving 
guilt or innocence found in the Constitution.  We can have little confidence 
that a judge-made substitute will do better. 
